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As Berle has said, the Securities Act,' though probably one of the most
spectacular types of legislation, is of secondary importance in a compre-
hensive program of social control over finance.' Some, however, have
believed, apparently in all sincerity, that the great drop in security values
in the last five years was the result of failure to tell the "truth about
securities." 3  And others have thought that with the Securities Act it
would be possible to prevent a recurrence of the scandals which have
brought many financiers into disrepute in recent years. As a matter of
fact there are but few of the transactions investigated by the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency which the Securities Act would
have controlled. There is nothing in the Act which would control the
speculative craze of the American public, or which would eliminate
wholly unsound capital structures. There is nothing in the Act which
would prevent a tyrannical management from playing wide and loose with
scattered minorities, or which would prevent a new pyramiding of hold-
ing companies violative of the public interest and all canons of sound
finance. All the Act pretends to do is to require the "truth about securi-
ties" at the time of issue, and to impose a penalty for failure to tell the
truth. Once it is told, the matter is left to the investor.
But even the whole truth cannot be told in such simple and direct
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3. See, e.g., 73d Cong., 1st Sess., H. R. REP. 85 (1933) at 2.
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terms as to make investors discriminating. A slow educational process
must precede that. Those who need investment guidance will receive
small comfort from the balance sheets, statistics, contracts, and details
which the prospectus reveals. Thus the effects of such an Act, though
important, are secondary and chiefly of two kinds: (1) prevention of
excesses and fraudulent transactions, which will be hampered and de-
terred merely by the requirement that their details be revealed; 4 and
(2) placing in the market during the early stages of the life of a security
a body of facts which, operatifig indirectly through investment services
and expert investors, will tend to produce more accurate appraisal of
the worth of the security if it commands a broad enough market.
At the present time one could not expect more far reaching effects.
The economy under which we live is not static. Industry is not stabilized
and under our present methods never can be. Competition and the pro-
gress of invention make it inevitable that many enterprises will fail. The
toll of technology over a period of years is enormous. And the down-
ward turn of the business cycle may eliminate more than just the mar-
ginal enterprise. Other factors of management, not related to cupidity
and fraud, contribute to the same end. As a result, a substantial per-
centage of industrial investment will in any event be lost. To speak then
of underwriting the values which are based on such unstable foundations
is sheer nonsense. And to expect that the judgment of investors as re-
speets these imponderable factors will -improve perceptibly in this genera-
tion is baseless optimism.
This is reason enough why the state should not pronounce investments
sound or unsound.' To the business community it seems likewise suffi-
cient reason for tempering and moderating the liabilities of those respon-
sible for the issue. For, it is said that when security values shrink as they
have in the last few years it is but natural to find blame laid at the door
of those who got the money, who were identified with the flotation, or
who were connected with the management. In that connection it is also
urged that risks should not be placed so high as to deter substantial and
honest men from engaging in legitimate business. On the other hand,
it is insisted, as legislative history has shown, that the mere requirement
that the truth about securities be told is ineffective unless the penalties
are so severe as to make it improvident not to tell it. Like most questions
of law the problem reduces itself to one of degree. It is around this mat-
4. See Frankfurter, The Federal Securities Act: 11 (1933) 8(2) FORTUNE 53, 55.
5. See Section 23 of the Act, making it unlawful to represent to any prospective pur-
chaser that the fact that the registration statement is filed or is in effect or that a stop
order is not in effect is a finding by the Federal Trade Commission that the registration
statement is true and accurate or that the Commission has in any way passed upon the
merits of the issue or given approval to it. And see H. R. REP. 85, op. cit. supra note 3,
at 4; Frankfurter, supra note 4, at 108.
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ter of giving maximum protection to investors with minimum interference
to business that the present battle on the Act is being waged.
It is not the purpose of this article to prove or disprove that the Act
is serving as an unhealthy deterrent to legitimate business. Rather an
attempt will be made to give a picture of the impact of the Act on various
parties and the functions they perform. Secondly, it will be shown how
the Act promises to defeat in part its purpose by virtue of its uncertain-
ties. This is of primary importance in two ways. In the first place it
increases many fold the hazards which business feels. A decade from
now when courts have completed the task of interpreting the Act many
of those fears will have been proved to be unreal. Nevertheless, in terms
of attitudes, they are at present real and one man's guess as to what
courts will do will not be sufficient to offset another's fear of what they
might do. The problem thus resolves itself into one of going as far as
possible in making the Act clear and unequivocal both in principle and
in detail. In the second place the presence of so many uncertainties
serves to detract attention from the fundamental purpose of the Act-
protection of investors. Nevertheless, in spite of the varied issues raised
by the present battle over the Act, it cannot be denied that the principles
embodied in the Act have become a permanent and integral part of our
legal system. The present problem is not their abolition or retention but
the discovery of ways and means of accomplishing expeditiously and
efficiently their avowed purposes.
II
CIvIL AND CRI mNAL LIABILITY
The civil liabilities imposed by the Act6 are not only compensatory
in nature but also in terrorem. They have been set high to guarantee
that the risk of their invocation will be effective in assuring that the
"truth about securities" will be told. There are two types of situations
to which civil liability attaches. One is the sale of securities which must
be registered. The other is the sale of any security, registered or not,
except for a few hereafter discussed. Liability on the registration state-
ment is imposed by Section 11;1 liability on-sales generally, by Section
12.
6. None of these civil liabilities supplants any common-law or other remedy by pur-
chasers of securities against any of the parties named or others. See § 16. The liabilities
imposed arise solely out of this federal legislation. For its bases see Isaacs, The Securities
Act and the Constitution (1933) 43 YALm L. J. 218.
7. See Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act (1933) 43 YArm L. J. 227, 251; H.
R. REP. 85, op. cit. supra note 3, at 2, 3; Landis, Address before the New York State Society
of Certified Public Accountants, Wall St. Journal, Nov. 1, 1933, at 10.
8. The classes of persons to which Section 11 applies and their various defenses are
discussed at p. 190, infra.
1933]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
Materiality, Causation and Damages
Actions for rescission or damages may be maintained under Section
11 by any purchaser in case "any part of the registration statement,
when such part became effective, contained an untrue statement of a
material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated
therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading." '
It would not be profitable to discuss here the philosophical and pragmatic
distinctions' between "fact" and "opinion." It is worthy of note, how-
ever, that the use of the word "material" has introduced certain innova-
tions somewhat foreign to the common law. In the first place material-
ity is to be judged as of one point of time-the date when that particular
part of the registration statement became effective. The purchaser may
have purchased shortly after that date or several years subsequently.
Yet he is not required to prove that an untrue statement or omission
was material at the time of his purchase. Thus contentions that the Act
uses materiality in reference to facts material to the investment are not
strictly true. The market may have wholly discounted the misstate-
ment at the time of plaintiff's purchase. Nevertheless proof of that by
the defense would not warrant dismissal of the complaint. This is a
strict interpretation of the Act but it seems to be in conformity with the
design with which it was drawn."' In the second place the Act requires
no proof of reliance by plaintiff on the untruth or omission. Neither the
plaintiff nor anyone else need have known of it. In this connection there
is, however, the defense that plaintiff knew of the untruth or omission.
These two factors materially improve the position of investors. By
some it is feared that the road of the blackmailer is made too easy, and
that every suit brought must be settled because of the impregnable posi-
tion in which the plaintiff is placed. Nevertheless it is true that the sec-
tion gives to investors additional protection long needed. Satisfaction of
the common-law requirements of fraud raised almost insurmountable bar-
riers to recovery. The road of investors has not been an easy one owing
to the common-law insistence on scienter, reliance, and causation.'
When the Act provides for damages it likewise introduces distinct in-
novations. Materiality is referred neither to plaintiff's investment nor
to his damages. For example, a security is offered to the public at $100.
9. § 11(a).
10. See Shulman, supra note 7, at 236 et seq.
11. If the Act were interpreted to mean that a particular untruth or omission must be
related to the date when plaintiff purchased the security, there would have to be read into
the section a provision which is not there, namely, that the untruth or omission was "ma-
terial" not only at the effective date of the registration but also at subsequent times.
This would seem counter to the intent of Congress of lightening the burden of proof on
purchasers. See H. R. REP. 85, op. cit. supra note 3, at 9, 10.
12. See Shulnan, supra note 7, at 229 et seq.
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At the end of a year plaintiff buys at $50. Thereafter the market drops
to $25 at which price plaintiff sells. Facts wholly foreign to the registra-
tion statement have sent the price from $50 to $25. Yet plaintiff can
recover $25 provided the registration statement contained a material un-
truth or omission and provided the defense does not prove that plaintiff
knew of such untruth or omission at the time of purchase.13 This is
merely one example of what is meant when it is said that the action for
damages is derivative from the action of rescission.1
4
But the point is carried farther-farther, it is submitted, than the Act
warrants. It is provided that "In no case shall the amount recoverable
under this section exceed the price at which the security was offered to
the public."'" If the purchaser still owns the security he may on tend-
ering it back to any of the parties under Section 11 recover what he paid
for it,' provided he paid less than the public offer price. In case he paid
more than the public offer price he would be entitled to receive only an
amount equal to that price. If he bought at $125, the public offering
price being $100, and the price dropped to $50 he might elect to rescind
and recover $100. But if he sold at $50 he might recover damages of
$75. Now it has been asserted that in such a case the damages recover-
able would be $50-the difference between the public offering price
and the price at which plaintiff sold." In other words it is claimed that
the subsection quoted means what would have been meant if it had
provided "In no case shall the amount recoverable as damages under this
section exceed the amount by which the price at which the security was
offered to the public is in excess of the price at which plaintiff sold the
security." Section 11 (g), however, does not use such a measure. If
courts thus restrict the measure of damages, they may or may not be
conforming to the intent of Congress. But they certainly would be
reading into the Act words that are not there.
Admittedly certain trading losses are recoverable. 8 And if the Act is
interpreted in light of the ordinary meaning of the language employed,
any trading losses are recoverable as damages-provided they do not
exceed in amount the public offering price and provided, of course, that
the registration statement contains a material untruth or omission. Thus
a security never falls in price below the public offering price of $100.
13. See Landis, supra note 7, at 10.
14. See ibid; Frankfurter, supra note 4, at 108.
15. § 11(g).
16. "... with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon." §
11(e).
17. Landis, supra note 7, at 10. A case is put where the offering price of a bond is
$100. A buys it on the market at $75. B at $125. It is said, ". . . assume that A and B
have disposed of their bonds on the market at $60. A, who had paid $75 for his bond,
could recover $15, whereas B who paid $125 for his bond recovers not $65 but $40."
IS. See discussion pp. 174-175, supra, and Landis, supra note 7.
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But owing to factors in no way associated with the untruth or omission
in the registration statement the price rises to $200, at which plaintiff
buys, and then falls to $100 at which plaintiff sells. It is by no means
clear that plaintiff could not recover $100.10 If he can, so can subsequent
purchasers where there are similar oscillations in the market price. It
is for reasons like the foregoing that damages are said to be apparently
illimitable under Section 11.
Congress may not have intended to include in rescission or damages
cases where damage suffered bore no relation to misrepresentations made
nor cases where the price of the security never fell below the public
offering price. Yet the courts which are to interpret these provisions
are many and it will take years before authoritative decision is had."0
Meanwhile reasonable men will continue to interpret the section differ-
ently, and the resulting uncertainty will force into prominence the in
terrorem aspects of the section.
As stated above the protection given to investors by Section 11 fills a
long felt need in so far as it shifts the burden of proof. This is particu-
larly desirable during the early life of the security. At that time the
registration statement will be an important conditioner of the market.
Plaintiff may be wholly ignorant of anything in the statement. But if
he buys in the open market at the time he may be as much affected by the
concealed untruths or the omissions as if he had read and understood
the registration statement. So it seems wholly desirable to create a pre-
sumption in favor of the investor in this regard. If carried out logically,
however, some time limitation might be placed upon this presumption,
for in most cases after a year or so the statements made in the registration
would have become outmoded and wholly discounted by a host of other
factors. In other words, the present provision for reliance provides an
excellent rule of thumb during the early life of the security. It has less
justification the longer the security is outstanding.
The irrelevancy of the relation between plaintiff's purchase or plain-
tiff's damages and the untruths or omissions avoids a complicated pro-
cedural matter which the average investor has no competence to handle. 1
The result of it, however, is in many cases to hand purchasers nothing
but windfalls. It is at least arguable that the Act would accomplish
all that is needful if it merely made the defense prove the absence of
materiality of the untruths or omissions either as respects investment or
damages. Whatever scope is ultimately given to the section the policy it
19. The position has been taken by Baldwin B. Bane, Chief, Securities Division, Fed-
eral Trade Commission, that such trading losses are not recoverable. See Washington Re-
lease, Sept. 22, 1933, N. Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1933, at 21.
20. In this connection it should be noted that the Commission has no jurisdiction to
interpret such matters. See p. 213, infra.
21. Cf. Frankfurter, supra note 4; Shulman, supra note 7.
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contains should be made clear and the formulae it adopts made unequivo-
cal. It must be remembered that this section contains the major in ter-
rorer effects. It should be made sufficiently explicit so as to permit
reasonable prediction of risks.
In this connection it should be noted that Section 11 applies to all
registrations. But it has been drawn largely with reference to one type
of case-where a corporation makes a public offering of securities. Yet
it also applies to private offerings.22 Section 11(g) needs, therefore, to
make provision for the measure of damages in such cases. This is like-
wise true of the issue of certificates of deposit by committees..28  How
are damages measured or measurable under Section 11? Any one of
several methods could be employed. Special and adequate provision
must also be made for this type of case.
The foregoing observations apply only to Section 11. Under Section
12 the results are quite different. Section 11 gives civil rights to all
purchasers (from whomsoever they purchase) against those liable on the
registration statement. Section 12, however, limits suits to those by
buyers against their immediate sellers. There are two such types of suits
permitted. If a security is sold in violation of Section 5, the purchaser
may sue the seller in rescission or damages.24  To maintain his suit he
need only show violation of Section 5. Causation, reliance, misrepresenta-
tion, damages are all irrelevant. In rescission he would recover what he
had paid (with interest, less income received). In damages the measure
of recovery is uncertain but probably is the difference between what he
had paid and the price at which he had sold.25 This remedy is strictly
and wholly punitive.
The remedy under Section 12 (2), however, is probably compensatory.
If any one "sells" (by use of any agency of interstate commerce or of
the mails) any security,"' whether or not registered, by means of a
"prospectuses or oral communication" which includes an "untrue state-
ment of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading," he is liable to the "person purchasing such security
from him" either in rescission or "damages," as follows. The purchaser
apparently must prove that he did not know of such untruth or omission.
Defendant must sustain the burden of proof that he did not know and
22. See pp. 184 et seq., infra.
23. See pp. 185 et seq., infra.
24. § 12(1).
25. But the section does not state whether if it adopts as the measure the difference
between the purchase price and market value, or the difference between the value as
represented and the market value at the time of purchase. See Shulman, supra note 7, at
244, 249.
26. Except those exempt by Section 3(a) (2) which in general are United States bonds,
state and municipal bonds, and securities of national and certain state banks.
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in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known of such untruth
or omission. There is no point of time to which materiality is related. It
therefore is perhaps an open question whether such facts or omissions
must be material as of the time of statement or of purchase. The more
reasonable view would be that of the Companies Act, making materiality
refer to the latter." The measure of damages here as under Section 11
is probably the difference between the purchase price and the price at
which the security was disposed of. Such a construction is not, however,
a necessary one. In any event it will require judicial construction to
determine with finality both the measure of damages and the extent
to which the section preserves the common-law elements of causation.
In the latter connection it seems not unlikely that for practical purposes
the effect of the section is to eliminate it as a separate inquiry. It is
clear, however, that it makes radical changes in the common-law action
of fraud and deceit by eliminating all inquiry as to scienter and perhaps
as to reliance.2
Contribution
Section 11 (f) permitting contribution "as in cases of contract" between
persons liable on the registration statement was taken almost bodily
from the Companies Act.29 Criticism frequently has been made of its
vagueness and of the impossibility of its application. Section 11(f) is
to be construed against the background of the common law and the few
decisions arising under the Companies Act.30 From these it is probable,
27. Cf. Cackett v. Keswick, 85 L. T. R. 14 (1901). In contrast to the Act, the Companies
Act provides for an action of damages as follows: ". . . to all persons who subscribe for
any shares or debentures on the faith of the prospectus for the loss or damage they may
have sustained by reason of any untrue statement therein . . ." 19 & 20 GEO. V, c. 23, §
37(1) (d) (1929).
28. As to damages see note 25, supra. It is arguable that reliance is still necessary
by virtue of the language "by means of a prospectus or oral communication." cf. § 2 (10).
29. Supra note 27, § 37(g).
30. Thus under the Act the contract right to contribution avoids application of the tort
doctrine-actio personalis moritur cum persona-and therefore permits contribution from
the executors of a co-contractor. This was the common-law rule in contract cases, WILLIs-
TON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 1286; Batard v. Hawes, 2 El. & BI. 285 (1852); Durfee v. Kelly,
228 Mass. 571, 117 N. E. 907 (1917), and is the rule under the Companies Act. Shepheard
v. Bray, [19061 2 Ch. 235. But see same case on appeal, [1907] 2 Ch. 571. Likewise the
ordinary rule that there can be no contribution between joint tort feasors becomes in-
applicable, aside from the specific exemption in the statute. Gerson v. Simpson, [1903]
2 K. B. 197. And see WrMLISTON, op. cit. supra, § 345; Note (1926) 74 U. oF PA. L. REv.
319. Furthermore, under thq Act where some of the co-contractors are insolvent or out of
the jurisdiction those solvent and in the jurisdiction must contribute equally. This is true
under the Companies Act, Shepheard v. Bray, supra, and was true of the common law,
where only pro rata contribution was allowed. Williams v. Riehl, 127 Cal. 365, 59 Pac. 762
(1899); Browne v. Lee, 6 H. & C. 689 (1827). Contra: Liddell v. Wiswell, 59 Vt. 365, 8
Ati. 680 (1887); Wetmore & Morse Granite Co. v. Ryle, 93 Vt. 245, 107 At. 109 (1919).
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though not certain, that the parties liable on the registration statement
may by contract allocate inter se their liability. There is no doubt but
that such contracts were enforceable at common law.31 One exception
to this under the Act is the case where the party suing was guilty of
fraudulent misrepresentations while the party sued was not. Another is
the fact that the right to contribution of those liable under Section 15 does
not seem to be covered by Section 11(f).
If the courts adopt the view that all parties, including those liable under
Section 15, may dispose of the problem by express contract, that should
take care of most of the cases. But even so, there would remain a resid-
ual group presenting complicated situations. These will inevitably
arise, first because uncertainty in the Act will result in persons being
held to be afoul of Section 5 who did not suspect that they were; and
secondly because those brought into the flotation will at times not obtain
an express contract either because of ignorance or inferior bargaining
position. The only workable rule to apply to this residual group is the
one of pro rata contribution according to the rules of law and equity
already mentioned. On the whole, judged by administrative expediency,
this is probably as simple and satisfactory a way to handle the matter
But in equity the shares of the solvent ones would be increased proportionately. Gross v.
Davis, 87 Tenn. 226, 11 S. W. 92 (1888). Likewise co-contractors absent from the juris-
diction were generally eliminated from the calculation. Security Insurance Co. v. St. Paul
Fire & Maine Insurance Co., 50 Conn. 233 (1882); Whitman v. Porter, 107 Mass. 522
(1371); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Naylor, 237 Fed. 314 (C. C. A. 8th,
1916); Jones v. Blanton, 41 N. C. 115 (1849). In addition, the action for contribution in
contract is limited to the amount for which the co-contractor was initially liable. Wivnis-
oroN, op. cit. supra, § 1279. Thus under the Companies Act it has been held that neither the
costs of a settlement which were not included in the amount of damages nor costs recover-
able under that Act are recoverable in an action of contribution. Shepheard v. Bray,
supra; cf. Boardman v. Paige, 11 N. H. 431 (1840) WiLLIsTox, op. cit. supra, § 1284.
31. In Batard v. Hawes, supra note 30, Lord Campbell said, at 296, "If the original ar-
rangement was inconsistent with the fact that each was to pay his share, no action for such
contribution could be maintained. Thus if, by arrangement between themselves, one of
the joint contractors, though liable to the creditor, was not to be liable to pay any portion
of the debt, it is clear that no action could be maintained against him." And see United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Naylor; Jones v. Blanton, both supra note 30; Loring
v. Bacon, 57 Mass 465 (1849); Ree'd v. Rogers, 134 Ark. 528, 204 S. W. 973 (1918); Le-
high Valley Trust Co. v. Strauss, 253 Pa. 382, 101 Atl. 1047 (1917); Cambria Title, Savings
& Trust Co. v. Barron, 223 Pa. 116, 141 Atl. 845 (1928). See also WILrSTON, op. cit. supra
note 30, §§ 345, 1279, 1282. "When one of two sureties becomes such at the request of
his co-surety and upon his promise that he would be put to no loss, he may recover the
whole of what he may have been compelled to pay of his co-surety, and such promise may
be shown by parol." Hayden v. Thrasher, 18 Fla. 795, 805 (1881). Accord: Reed v.




as any. To resort to fault,8 2 compensation,"3 or extent of participation3 4
would be even more confusing.
Nevertheless, even though the substantive rule is reduced to simple
terms, the procedural difficulties are exceedingly complex. Under Sec-
tion 22 federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over such
suits. Furthermore, each defendant has the defense that if he were to
be sued separately by a purchaser he would not be liable. His defense
might or might not be the same as plaintiff's defense to a purchaser's
action. But even though the defenses were the same, defendant's lia-
bility to purchasers would have to be tried. The court which would try
that issue might not (and probably would not) be the court which pre-
viously had tried plaintiff's liability to purchasers, or which subsequently
would try any suits by purchasers against defendant. The decision by
the court as to defendant's duty to contribute would not end the matter,
unless all parties liable under Section 11 had been joined by plaintiff
or interpleaded by defendant and all were solvent. But it would be un-
usual to find this situation. The normal result would be that those before
the court would proceed to other courts to sue other parties liable under
Section 11. In those new suits the identical defenses previously tried
might have to be tried again. It can readily be seen how complicated
and repetitious the situation could become when it is remembered that
32. As in cases like Lowell v. Boston and Lowell Rr. Corp., 40 Mass. 24 (1839);
Kiffer v. Bienstock, 128 Misc. 451, 218 N. Y. Supp. 526 (Mun. Ct. 1926); Hoggan v.
Cahoon, 26 Utah 444, 73 Pac. 512 (1903).
33. It seems doubtful if the difference in compensation received by the various parties
would control their pro rata shares. One analogy is the case of a compensated surety and
accommodation surety at common law. It was there held that the mere fact that one co-
surety was compensated for his suretyship and the other became surety merely for accom-
modation was immaterial in an action for contribution by the former against the latter.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Naylor, supra note 30; United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. v. McGinnis' Administrator, 147 Ky. 781, 145 S. W. 1112 (1912); Leach v.
Commercial Savings Bank, 205 Iowa 975, 213 N. W. 612 (1927). See WILISToN, op. cit.
supra note 30, § 1280.
34. Regarding, however, the parties liable on the registration statement as quasi-joint
adventurers, the old partnership rule of contribution (in absence of contract to the con-
trary) according to their respective participation in the profits is suggested. Uuosa,
PARTNRsHI, AcT § 18(a). This might be applicable in suits between underwriters but
obviously would have no application to suits by issuer against directors, officers against
experts, underwriters against officers, etc. Likewise the common-law analogy of the
restriction of liability of sureties to the amount of their respective bonds might be useful
in limiting the inter se liability under the Act to the amount of the participation by the
various parties. See WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 30, § 1279. But the only groups to
which this would apply would be issuers and underwriters. To the others it obviously has
no application.
35. If they were both directors, the defense would be the same. If one was an expert
and the other a director; or if one was an issuer and the other was a director; or if one
was an underwriter and the other was an expert, the defenses available under Section
11 would be different. See discussion under III, infra.
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under the normal issue there would be at least many dozen and often sev-
eral hundred people prospectively liable under Section 11. Still further,
under Section 11(f) there probably would be several suits for contribu-
tion arising successively over a period of years each time one party paid
a new claim. The spectacle is unseemly, inefficient and expensive at the
very best. No one can possibly benefit from it except those who prosper
on litigation. It seems clear that enforcement of the contribution provi-
sions should be by one tribunal. 6
The right to contribution certainly is an ameliorating factor to be con-
sidered in evaluating the severity of the penalties imposed under Section
11. If the section means that all liability inter se may be governed by
contract, theoretically it becomes possible for a person apparently illimit-
ably liable to be free from liability. Actually, however, this is not true,
not only because that construction of the section is unnecessary but also
for the reasons which follow. Under the Act as drawn its uncertainties
make it possible for unwary persons to be held. This is nowhere more
clear than under section 15, which is discussed hereafter. Furthermore,
those specified in Section 11 are not of equal bargaining positioni. Even
if they are, they run the risk of insolvency-of their promissor. And the
risks are so uncertain that it is unlikely that surety bonds can be readily
obtained to cover them. In any event men who act reasonably and in
good faith balk at the opportunities which the Act offers to become en-
gaged in extensive litigation to vindicate their reputation and to mature
their claims against other parties.
Criminal Penalties
Certain phases of the criminal provisions of the Act have been con-
sidered in an accompanying article.37 In addition thereto only a few
points need be mentioned here. Section 17 makes3" unlawful all schemes
to defraud. 9 Likewise it makes unlawful even innocent acts to obtain
money or property by means of untrue statements of material facts or
omissions to state material facts.40 The section applies to all securities
whether or not they are exempt from registration. 1 No penalties are
stated nor any civil rights expressly .given. Section 17 probably does
36. See p. 215, infra.
37. MfacIntyre, Criminal Provisions of the Securities Act and Analogies to Similar Crim-
inal Statutes (1933) 43 YAxa L. J. 254.
38. It is of course in relation to the sale of any security "by the use of any means or
instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the
mails . . ." § 17(a).
39. Section 17(a) (1) relates to the employment of "any device, scheme, or artifice
to defraud . . .'; Section 17(a) (3) to engagement "in any transaction, practice, or course
of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser."
40. § 17(a) (2).
41. § 17(c). Thus even federal government bonds are included.
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not enlarge civil remedies of purchasers.4 2  This seems clear by nega-
tive implication, since Sections 11 and 12 expressly state the remedies
which are available. It is clear, however, that a willful violation of Sec-
tion 17 would give rise to the criminal penalties of Section 24. Further-
more Section 20 gives the Commission power to investigate any violation
of the Act and to obtain injuctive relief against such violations.43  So it
is evident that a violation of Section 17 even though innocent would be
grounds for such investigation or injunction. And, as noted, it is suffi-
ciently broad to be applicable to government bonds and insurance policies
as well as to any other security whether long outstanding, presently issued
or in the process of issuance. Wisely used this injunctive power and the
criminal penalties can go further in real protection of the investor than
mere piling up of civil penalties. But as is made clear in the accompany-
ing article on criminal provisions,' we had, so far as criminal law goes, a
fair "arsenal of weapons"4 to employ against subversive practices during
the last decade. Yet little attempt was made to use them, and the failure
can hardly be blamed solely upon limited state jurisdiction. Essentially
it is a pfoblem of law administration which no amount of additional legis-
lation can assure.
Section 17 contains an additional provision controlling tipster sheets
and certain practices of those who purvey financial news and render in-
vestment counsel. Its general purpose is to require disclosure of any
consideration and the amount thereof received or to be received, directly
or indirectly, from an issuer, underwriter or dealer. Its willful violation
entails criminal liability, and it likewise is subject to injunctive control.40
III
SECURITIES AND TRANSACTIONS AFFECTED
The Act defines a "security" in very broad terms." Many sorts of
contracts, such as those of insurance,48 not usually considered to be
42. Query, whether the making of an act unlawful by the Act gives to purchasers an
action of rescission on the grounds of illegality. It should be noted that Section 16 preserves
all existing remedies at law or equity.
43. See pp. 212, 213, infra.
44. MacIntyre, supra note 37.
45. See p. 211, infra.
46. This subsection will serve a useful purpose and should have an effective deterrent
influence. But it needs clarification to differentiate between cases where a security is offered
for sale and where it is not. Other difficulties are raised by the subsection but space does
not permit their elaboration.
47. See § 2(1).
48. The definition in Section 2(1) is broad enough to include them, and their specific
exemption under Section 3(8) from the registration and other requirements of Section
S supports this inference. If it is correct, transactions in them are subject to restrictions
upon sales of other "securities."
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securities are included. The sweeping character of the definition was
presumably dictated by a desire to prevent the use of allied forms for
purposes of evasion. While the Act gives little direct recognition to
the differing characteristics of these various securities,49 the Commission
may in most instances by authorized rules and regulations fix require-
ments suited to particular circumstances.0 0
Directly and by implication the Act provides for or recognizes several
classes of exemptions. Some apply to the nature of the transaction, others
to the kind of security involved, and still others to the circumstances of
the issue. In the first place security issues, and any subsequent transac-
tions therein, over which Congress clearly lacks jurisdiction (since con-
summated from solicitation to delivery without the use of agencies of
interstate commerce or the malls) are subject to none of the provisions
of the ActP
Where the Act does apply, distinction is made between securities (and
transactions therein) subject to the registration and prospectus require-
ments of Secton 5 and those subject only to such other provisions as Sec-
tions 12(2) and 17. No securities or transactions are exempt from Sec-
tion 17.2 Only securities of the United States government and its poli-
tical subdivisions and certain instrumentalites thereof and of certain
banks, and transactions therein, are exempt from Section 12 (2)." The
requirement of registration and effective registration, invoking risks of
penalties under Sections 11, 12(1), and 24, do not remove risks under
Sections 12(2) and 17.
Exemptions from Section 5 include several kinds of securities. 4 The
49. Such, for example, as making a protective committee an "issuer," requiring its
"principal accounting officer" to sign the registration statement, and giving its members no
defenses of good faith or diligence.
50. See the discussion on pp. 213 et. seq.
51. Civil liability under Section 12 would probably follow even though only part of the
entire transaction was consummated in interstate commerce or through the mails. Thus
solicitation of the sale through the mails or by interstate commerce followed by delivery
of the security in a wholly intrastate transaction without use of the mails would probably
be sufficient, and vice versa. Cf. § 2(7) defining "interstate commerce." See Dean,
The Federal Securities Act: I (1933) 8(2) FORTUxE 50. The same result follows under
Section 11. See H. R. REP., op. cit. supra note 3, at 22. But in connection with Section
11 a person is entitled to rely on the registration and need not prove he relied on it, even
though this particular transaction was an intrastate sale not involving the use of the
mails. Cf, however, § 5(c).
52. Including securities of the United States Government.
53. §§ 12(2) and 3(a) (2). Constitutional problems and political expediency may
have dictated the exemption of securities issued by states and their political subdivisions and
certain instrumentalities thereof.
54. § 3(a), except paragraph (1). In addition Section 3(b) gives the Commission
discretion to exempt other classes of securities under certain conditions, but no issue of any
such class is exempt "where the aggregate amount at which such issue is offered to the public
1933]
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only uncertainty which will arise here will be whether a given security
falls within or without the rule. Bonds of the United States5 or the
stock of a common carrier subject to the provisions of Section 20(a) of
the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, 6 are clearly exempt. On the
other hand, a security issued by a State bank whose business is super-
vised by a State bank commissioner is exempt only if its business "is
substantially confined to banking." 7
Other exemptions from Section 5 are based on the time and circum-
stances of the issue. Any security "sold or disposed of by the issuer or
bona fide offered to the public" prior to July "27, 1933, is exempt.0 8 But
this exemption does not apply to "any new offering of any such security
by an issuer or underwriter" subsequent to July 26, 1933.9
exceeds $100,000." The Commission pursuant to this power has already exempted some
securities. Ruling, Nov. 1, 1933. By negative implication such securities, no matter the
amount involved, may be made exempt by the Commission, if the securities are privately
offered.
55. § 3(a) (2).
56. § 3(a) (6).
57. § 3(a) (2). "Banking" may be a "trade term" subject to definition by the Com-
mission. See discussion p. 213, infra.
58. § 3(a) (1). Question has arisen as to whether securities pledged by an issuer
prior to July 27, 1933, may be considered to have been "sold or disposed of by the
issuer." Perhaps "disposed of" is sufficiently broad for the purpose. Cf. § 2(3). If that
term is not applicable and if a pledge is not a sale within Section 2(3), the value to the
pledgee is seriously affected, for he frequently could not force the pledgor-issuer to register.
59. § 3(a) (1). Question has been raised as to whether "new offering" contemplates
only public or both public and private offerings. Dean, supra note 51, at 52. Consonant
with the other registration provisions of the Act, it would appear that the word "public"
had been omitted by design. Thus, under Section 4(1) providing exemption for "trans-
actions by an issuer not with or through an underwriter and not involving any public
offering," new private offerings by issuers without "underwriting" are exempt. Registration
is invoked for the issuer either by a "public offering" or by "underwriting."
With the presence of "underwriting," however, several problems are raised. Any security
holder who may be held to have been in control of, or controlled by, or under common con-
trol with, the "issuer," as defined in Section 2(4), and who sells to any person who may have
a view to "distribution" or has any person "sell" for him with such a view, becomes an
"issuer" for the purposes of Section 2(11) ; and the person purchasing from or selling for
him becomes an "underwriter." § 2(11). Such a person who becomes an "issuer" under
Section 2(11) probably is not required to sign the registration statement if he can get the
actual issuer to register. So he would not be liable if he were a controlled person, though
by Section 15 he would be if he controlled the actual issuer. Unless he did control, how-
ever, he probably could not get the actual issuer to register, and even then his control
would have to be dominant in order to induce other persons involved, who would be
made liable, to accept the risk. If he sold to the "underwriter" without a registration
statement being in effect, his part of the transaction would be exempt under Section 4(1),
since the term "issuer" in that section refers only to an."issuer" as defined in Section 2(4),
while the "underwriter's" part might be subject to Section 24 if the purchase were held to
involve an "offer to buy" under Section 5(a) (1). The "underwriter" would be liable for
his sales under both Sections 12(1) and 24.
If the new offerings referred to in Section 3(1) are registered, the problem will arise of
distinguishing registered from unregistered securities. This problem will also arise in cases
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Other securities are exempt from registration according to the cir-
cumstances of the original offering, but since only that offering, rather
than the securities themselves, is exempt from Section 5, subsequent trans-
actions in them probably are not exempt.60 There are four such exemp-
tions. If agencies of interstate commerce are not employed, if the issuer
is a resident of, or, if a corporation, incorporated by, and doing business
within a single state or territory, and if the security is "sold" only to per-
sons resident within that state or territory, the "sale" is not subject to
Section 5 even though the mails are used.6 If an issue involves neither
"underwriting" nor "a public offering," it is exempt.6" If an issue is ex-
where several registrations are filed for the same security over a period of years. Although
all issues of a security may have similar shares in management, earnings and assets, the
rights possessed by their holders to sue on registration statements would differ. Dealers
would have to observe the distinction if they were to gain the exemption provided for them
in Section 4(1). If they were differentiated, there might be a variation in price, determined
somewhat by the difference in rights under the Act but chiefly by the breadth of the
market for each and the costs of shifting investments, since there could be no arbitrage.
It appears improbable that they will be differentiated, unless the Commission has the power
to and does require it. If they are not differentiated, a person suing would have to prove
that he had acquired the particular security under that registration statement which in-
volved the alleged untruth or omission. If they are required to be differentiated, issuers
may try to register or reregister all securities of the sort then being offered, but such
registration is not provided for in the Act and may not be effective. See § 6(a) or practical
impediments in distribution may well "kill" the market.
60. With the result that a "dealer" who acquired such a security may not in its sale
employ agencies of interstate commerce or the mails "within one year after the last date
upon which the security was bona fide offered to the public by the issuer," etc. § 4 (1).
An "An underwriter" could never sell it by means of such agencies, with the indirect re-
sult that "underwriting" is thus made impossible for such issues in reorganizations under
court supervision as are exempt under Section 4(3). In other words Section 3(a) does
not provide that those securities are exempt where transactions in them are exempt by Sec-
tion 4. It has been stated, however, by an officer of the Commission that securities, trans-
actions in which are exempt under Section 4(3), are likewise exempt from Section 5. See
letter of Baldwin B. Bane, Sept. 6, 1933.
61. This exemption may have been considered safe because of state jurisdiction over the
offering. It might be an encouragement to local incorporation where capital needs and
supply are equalized within state lines. If this exemption from Section 5 is used, however,
the transactions even within the State become subject to Sections 12(2) and 17.
62. § 4(1). If any person purchases from the issuer who may be held to have
had a view to "distribution," then "underwriting" is present. "Distribution" is not defined,
but presumably may be defined by the Commission, under its power to define "trade terms."
See p. 213, infra.
A "public offering" is likewise not defined. If a protective committee is held to be an
"issuer" [f. note 104, infral, but no other persons solicit deposits for it, so that "under-
writing" cannot be said to be present, it may be plausible to insist that such a committee
need not register the certificates of deposit, because such solicitation as it made would not
amount to a "public offering." Is an offer to existing security holders of a corporation and
to them alone a private or a public offering? English courts have indicated that an offer
is public even though it is to a "defined class of the public." Nash v. Lynde, [1929] A. C.
158, 171; see also In re South of England Natural Gas & Petroleum Co., Ltd., [1911] 1
Ch. 573. Any number from "two to infinity may serve." Nash v. Lynde, supra, at 169.
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changed by the issuer "with its existing security holders exclusively, where
no commission or other remuneration is paid or given directly or indirectly
in connection with such exchange," such issuance is exempt." If a
corporation is "in the process of a bona fide reorganization. . . under
the supervision of any court,"64 the issuance of securities "to the existing
security holders or other existing creditors" of such corporation "either
in exchange for the securities of such security holders or claims of such
creditors or partly for cash and partly in exchange for the securities or
claims of such security holders or creditors," is exempt.6" The uncertain-
Under state "Blue Sky" laws an offer of subscription to stock in a farmers' cooperative
made to a group of interested citizens in one town or vicinity has been held not to con-
stitute a public offering. Cannon v. Farmers' Union Grain Agency, 103 Ore. 26, 202 Pac.
725 (1921); Kirk v. Farmers' Union Grain Agency, 103 Ore. 43, 202 Pac. 731 (1921). So
with one isolated sale through personal contact. Gillespie v. Long, 212 Ala. 34, 101 So.
651 (1924). If offerings to existing security holders of corporations were held not to con-
stitute public offerings, then an investment trust, say, might avoid the registration require-
ment by offering to exchange its securities in one corporation for those of another.
Such obviously was not the intent of Congress. Furthermore, the Commission's recogni-
tion of the registration requirement for certificates issued by or for protective committees
[cf. Form D-1 has considerable weight in the determination of the question. Perhaps the
Commission has the power to define "public offering" as being a "trade term." See § 19(a)
and p. 213, infra.
63. It is by no means clear that a simple refunding operation is exempt, for the exemp-
tion in Section 4(3) applies only "where no commission or other remuneration is paid or
given directly or indirectly in connection with such exchange . . ." If the exchange offer
is accompanied by the payment of fees for soliciting or guaranteeing exchanges the transac-
tion is clearly not exempt. This was probably the sole interest of Congress, but the wording
is not so restricted. The phrase may be held to include fees to transfer agents and others.
If so, the "issue" would have to be registered. The transfer agents and others might then
be held as "underwriters" because of their "participation." Cf. § 2(11). It would be an
unusual refunding operation in which no remuneration was paid directly or indirectly. Even
though Congress may have meant to include only fees for certain services, the actual un-
certainty has brought some refunding operations to a standstill, for fear of the severe penal-
ties imposed upon violators of the section. The statement has been made, however, by an
officer of the Commission that only fees for certain services are included and not expenses.
See III Commerce Clearing House Stocks and Bonds Law Service ff 7544.
It is clear that this part of Section 4(3) does not cover the issuance of securities by a
committee to be exchanged for securities of another "issuer." The language is,- "issuance
of a security of a person exchanged by it with its existing security holders exclusively."
64. The rule stated presents great administrative difficulties. It is impossible to predict
what "supervision" will be held to mean. If it means cases where the court is merely order-
ing a foreclosure pursuant to or following a reorganization, it will have fairly wide applica-
tion. If, however, the "supervision" required is of the plan, fewer cases will be included.
If it requires "supervision" of the kind specified under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act,
only occasional cases will fall within it. What "bona fide" adds is likewise uncertain. In
view of the vagueness of the test, prudence would dictate registration in most cases.
65. Whether- securities "issued" by committees come under this exemption is not
altogether clear. This will depend upon whether any of the wording in the preceding
clause [cf. note 63, supra] is interpreted as modifying this one. They probably are not
exempt, but in many cases this would be an academic question, for protective committees
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ties, however, as to what constitute a "public offer," "a bona fide reorgani-
zation under the supervision of any court," or "remuneration" paid di-
rectly or indirectly in connection with an exchange, and as to when
"underwriting" may be held to have been involved, probably make these
exemptions of limited application for the immediate future.66
The remaining exemptions from the provisions of Section 5 relate to
neither securities nor their issuance but to subsequent transactions therein.
Transactions by "any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer"
are exempt.6 7  Transactions by an "issuer not with or through an under-
writer and not involving any public offering" are also exempt."' "Deal-
ers' " transactions are exempt: (1) if they occur a year or more 9 "after
the last date upon which the security was bona fide offered to the public
by the issuer or by or through an underwriter" and do not involve securi-
ties constituting "the whole or a part of an unsold allotment to or sub-
scription by such dealer as a participant in the distribution of such securi-
ties by the issuer or by or through an underwriter"; 70 (2) if the securities
involved were never "bona fide offered to the public by the issuer or by
or through an underwriter"' and do not constitute the whole or part
of such an unsold allotment to the dealer; and (3) if they are purely
brokerage transactions "executed upon customers' orders on any exchange
or in the open or counter market," although "the solicitation of such
orders" is not exempt.
72
Registration Statements and Prospectuses
The circumstances under which registration statements must be in
effect have been discussed in the preceding section. In transactions not
exempted by Section 473 involving securities not exempt under Section 3
a person may not deliver securities for or after sale (by agencies of in-
terstate commerce or the mails) unless a prospectus meeting the re-
usually have to take action before the reorganization can, under any theory, be deemed
to be under court supervision. Securities issued entirely for cash are not exempt under
this part of Section 4(3).
66. The question even arises as to whether committees may gratuitously solicit deposits
or exchanges of securities not registered because exempt under Section 4(3). They might
well fall within the definition of "underwriter" [cf. § 2(11)1 and in soliciting deposits would
be violating Section 5 and would accordingly be liable under Sections 12(1) and 24.
67. § 4(1).
68. § 4(1). This provision exempts both the original issue and subsequent transac-
tions by an issuer.
69. "(excluding in the computation of such year any time during which a stop order
issued under Section 8 is in effect as to the security)" Ibid.
70. § 4(1). See the discussion on pp. 207 et seq., infra, and notes 209 and 211.
71. By negative implication from § 4(1).
72. § 4(2). See the discussion pp. 206 et seq.
73. Or by § S(c) if agencies of interstate commerce are not used.
19331
YALE LAW JOURNAL
quirements of Section 10 accompanies or precedes them.7 4  Nor may he
make use of any such agencies to transmit a prospectus relating to such
securities unless it meets those requirements.7 Such a prospectus dupli-
cates the registration statement, except for a few documents inclusion of
which is optional.76  The definition of "prospectus" is very broad, in-
cluding any letters, advertisements, or circulars offering a security for
sale.7" The Commission may classify prospectuses, however, "according
to the nature and circumstances of their use" and prescribe appropriate
forms and contents.78
Inasmuch as the Commission is empowered to change the informational
requirements for registration statements 79 and prospectuses, s° and pre-
sumably will employ this power to make the requirements reasonable8'
for the many classes of issuers and securities involved, 2 detailed con-
sideration of present requirements or of the Schedules in the Act is in-
appropriate here.
In general it may be said that much material information has been
required to be stated" and that the way has been opened for greater
clarity in accounting expression. What is required may, as some think, 4
be unbalanced in the stress laid upon ownership, underwriters' interests,
fees, and commissions. But this impression comes rather from the num-
ber of items in the Schedules than from its relative bulk in the whole
registration statement or from its availability to the investors.s' Obvi-
ously the* present requirements do not provide disclosure of all facts
74. § 5(b) (2).
75. § 5(b) (1). See, however, exceptions (a) and (b) of § 2(10).
76. § 10(a).
77. Cf. § 2(10).
78. § 10(b) (4). Cf. § 19(a).
79. § 7. Note that exclusions may only be made by "class of issuers or securities," while
additional information may be required in particular cases. Cf. also § 19(a).
80. § 10(b) (2) and (3).
81. Though, of course, appropriate to the protection of investors.
• 82. In its Forms C-1 (for investment trusts), D-1 (for certificates of deposit), and D-2
(for issues pursuant to a plan of reorganization), the Commission has made a start toward
recognition of requirements peculiar to certain classes of securities. The evolution and re-
finement of such requirements may be expected as the Commission gains experience and
conditions change. The task confronting the Commission is important and difficult. With-
out its aid many almost insoluble problems present in the schedules would raise hopeless
confusion and litigation.
83. In any particular instance more information is probably called for than would be
"material." This has the virtue of including such facts when they are material, but the
disadvantage of leaving the sorting process entirely to the investor. Issuers and investment
bankers will not assume the risk under the Act of doing it for them.
84. See the address delivered by A. H. Dean before the Financial Advertisers Association
Convention, New York.
85. Such information would not otherwise be available to investors as might other facts
about a company or general information as to an industry or economic conditions.
[Vol. 43
FEDERAL SECURITIES ACT
necessary to a sound investment judgment. They never can be pushed
that far. In any event they cannot go much further without falling
hopelessly within the realm of opinion rather than fact. It is the pre-
ponderance of unknowns as contrasted to knowns which makes of in-
vestment not only an inexact science but an imperfect art and which makes
investment losses inevitable and unavoidable.
On at least one point in connection with prospectuses required to con-
form to the provisions of Section 10 there is considerable uncertainty,
which the Commission by indirection may or may not be able to resolve.8 3
That is whether the new information required by Section 10(b)(1)
necessitates a new registration or an amendment involving a fresh set of
liabilities. If it does, it will work hardship on dealers who may have
no means of compelling such registration. 7 It is possible, however, that
such information, if it could be obtained otherwise,"8 would not necessi-
tate registration, and civil liability on such parts of the prospectus would
be confined to Section 12(2).'1
As to "prospectuses" on which liability may be invoked under Section
12 (2) there are several uncertainties. Such prospectuses include every
written communication or advertisement offering a security for sale.91
Only when the security was newly registered and prospectuses meeting
the requirements of Section 10 were available would the exceptions in
Section 2 (10) apply. As a result a letter which merely identified a secur-
ity, named its price, and offered to sell would be a "prospectus." Per-
haps only under exceptional conditions could such a prospectus lead to
liability under Section 12(2). 9' Any further statements, however, might
86. Through the exercise of its power under Section 10(b) to change informational re-
quirements for prospectuses. But see note 89, infra.
87. The period during which "dealers" are required to use a Section 10 prospectus may
extend far beyond the 13 months under which the original prospectus would serve. Pre-
sumably "underwriters" could contract with the issuer for a new registration, but it is not
clear that "dealers" who were not "underwriters" would have rights under that contract.
88. Not only would they have to obtain new financial statements, but also material con-
tracts made (not in the ordinary course of business) during the preceding year, remuneration
paid to certain officers, securities held by certain persons, and similar information. This
they would be unable to acquire in many cases, though it might be given to them in some.
89. But Section 10(a), which Section 10(b) (1) modifies, specifically provides that the
prospectus shall contain "the same statements made in the registration statement," not the
information specified in the Schedules. Thus it would appear that legally as well as prac-
tically the information required by Section 10(b) (1) must be based on a new registration.
90. Prospectuses meeting the requirements of Section 10, as well as other prospectuses,
are subject to Section 12(2).
91. Cf. § 2(10). It is not dear, but apparently the Commission has no power to rule on
prospectuses other than those specified in Section 5. Cf. § 19(a).
92. Dependent upon the interpretation of the phrase, "in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made," referring to omissions. A casual seller who neglected to
state that a stop order issued by the Commission was in effect might be held, for example. A
vendor who was known by the purchaser to be well informed on the condition of a com-
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be extremely hazardous. Here the disclosure presumably is not limited
by the informational requirements for registration statements. The
phrase, "in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,"
(relating in Section 12 (2) to misleading omissions of material facts) may
be used as a two-edged sword which at times will permit omissions and
at others will require the inclusion of material facts. While the burden
of proof to be sustained by a person sued under Section 12(2)3 is a
safeguard for the honest and diligent in case a statement is untrue, it
will afford less protection in the event of omissions. Some vendors could
fill several volumes with what they knew or could reasonably ascertain.
The question of omission would be dictated by their judgment of what
was material and what was misleading. But the risk of juries deciding




Issuers and dealers would appear to bear the major risks of liability
under Section 12(1). 1 As discussed above their liability is absolute,,"
but runs only to persons "purchasing" from them. 6 For violation of
Section 11 the issuer has only two defenses :17 that the person suing knew
of the untruth or omission at the time of acquiring the security; or that
the time limitation within which suits or actions might be brought had
run.98 All defenses of good faith, reasonable care, and reasonable in-
vestigation are of no avail to issuers. And the measure of damages is not
governed by losses sustained by reason of the untruth or omission. 9
Some may hold that this duty is not particularly severe, because the
pany might be held to have represented the security to be "worth" the price asked. Per-
sons who sold at a "market price" which they manipulated or knew was manipulated might
be held for failure to disclose that fact.
93. "that he did not know and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known,
of such untruth or omission." The shift in burden of proof is discussed p. 177, supra.
The additional observation should be made that knowledge of these material facts is
not peculiarly that of the vendor in all cases.
94. Because their acts would be more likely to result in violations of Section 5. If
directors were held to "control" corporations under Section 15, however, their liability would
likewise be invoked.
95. If suit is brought within two years after violation, § 13. Cf. last sentence of § 13.
96. § 12.
97. For alleged violation, of course, the issuer might prove that there was no such un-
truth or omission, or that the untruths or omissions did not involve material facts or in-
volved opinion rather than facts.
98. Ten years after the public offering is the maximum, § 13.
99. See the discussion pp. 174 et seq.
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issuer receives the proceeds of the issue, and because for corporate issuers
the liability is limited and impersonal. All made liable as issuers, how-
ever, are not corporations. In the first place, Section 15 in sweeping
language makes jointly and severally liable with and to the same extent
as any person (including the issuer) liable under Sections 11 and 12,
"every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or other-
-wise," or by agreement or understanding with others, "controls" such
person. This assuredly makes a majority stockholder liable, whether cor-
porate or not. Its further extension is uncertain. A dominant stock-
holder who may hold but a small percentage of the stock may be held
liable. Those whose proxies are obtained by a dominant group may be
liable.' °0 No one knows what "controls" will be held to mean. Consider-
ing the number of courts having jurisdiction' 01 uniform holdings will not
soon be forthcoming. Some courts might hold it to mean that type of
control' 02 which now renders stockholders liable for corporate debts.
But this would be an emasculation of Section 15. If that section is inter-
preted in light of its apparent scope, stockholders in a corporation may
be in a more hazardous position than directors and other persons made
liable under the Act, and the legislative sanction of limited liability will
be cast to the winds. Until all doubt is resolved a conservative manage-
ment will hesitate to guarantee the adequacy as well as accuracy of a
registration statement where that guarantee is to be backed by the entire
financial resources of the group without benefit of limited liability.
In the second place the actual issuer may not be a corporation.
03 Of
such instances none is more to the fore at the moment than that of so-
called protective committees. Protective committees have served a high
purpose (sometimes well and sometimes miserably) in the process of
financial rehabilitation or readjustment. Under the Act they become
absolute guarantors of the registration statement if they are held as
issuers. 4 Committees represent one type of issuer which does not re-
100. Presumably all stockholders are not made liable by virtue of the "control" they
possess. Query, whether several stockholders whose aggregate holdings comprise a majority
of the stock and who without express agreement support the management, would be liable.
And see note 59, supra.
101. All state as well as federal courts. § 22(a).
102. Douglas and Shanks, Insulation From Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations
(1929) 39 YA E L. 3. 193.
103. Cf. § 2(4) and (2).
104. With respect to certificates of deposit "the term 'issuer' means the person or persons
performing the acts and assuming the duties of depositor or manager pursuant to the pro-
visions of the trust or other agreement or instrument under which such securities are Lsued."
§ 2(4). A few committees might be able to avoid this category of "depositor or manager,"
but if they solicited deposits they would run the risk of being held as "underwriters."
But if the committee is an issuer and no other persons solicit deposits for it (so that "un-
derwriting" cannot be held to be present), then it may be plausible to insist that such com-
mittee need not register its certificates, because such solicitation as it made would not amount
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ceive the proceeds of the issue. But they have no defenses which other
issuers do not have. Provision is made for registration of certificates
of deposit,"°5 and recent rules and regulations of the Commission specify
requirements for such registration.' 6
The cumulative effects of the absolute liability of the issuer, the unde-
fined liability of stockholders,' 0 7 the liability of directors irrespective of
the nature of their appointments, 08 the liability of underwriters, and
the increasing difficulty on the part of issuers to obtain that underwrit-
ing, 10 9 make it more and more apparent that, whether rightly or wrongly,
justifiably or otherwise, the Act will prevent a great amount of financing
by many companies with well established businesses and will continue to
deter refunding operations and reorganizations.'"
Directors and Other Officers
Certain officers of the issuer are required to sign the registration state-
ment"' and as signers are subject to liability for the entire issue."
12
to a "public offering" under Section 4(1). This appears to be extremely doubtful. See the
discussion note 62, supra.
105. § 2'(4). If there is no registration statement in effect before deposits are solicited,
Section 5 is violated, since "sell" is so defined as to include solicitation of that kind.
§ 2(3). Such violation, if willful, entails criminal liability. § 24. Those who had ex-
changed securities for the certificates would have an action for rescission or damages
against the committee, even though the committee had made no untrue or misleading state-
ments and even though there was no causal connection between what was said or done and
what happened to the certificates. § 12(1). Any solicitation of deposits would have to in-
volve a prospectus satisfying the requirements of Section 10, or Section 5 would be vio-
lated and criminal and civil penalties would be incurred, as above. In case the solicitation of
deposits was based upon a specific plan of reorganization, then the registration statement
(and prospectus) must contain additional information prescribed by the Commission. Form
D-1, Part II. More commonly, however, the plan would be devised subsequent to deposit.
In that event, a new registration is involved and redeposit must be solicited with a new
prospectus if Section 5 is not to be violated. One more registration would be necessary
when the reorganized company issued the new securities, unless that issue were exempt [see
the discussion note 62, supra, but in that case the committee would not be the issuer,
though it might well be subject to the same liability through the control it exercised over
the issuer [§ 15] as a result of its dominant position in the reorganization. In any event
it runs the risk of being held as "underwriter" in soliciting exchanges. See note 104, supra.
106. Form D-1, Parts I and II. The extent to which these regulations decrease the
liability of committees is discussed pp. 213-214, infra.
107. Because of the obscurity of Section 15. Since the term "control" may have been
used in a loose, non-legal sense, the Commission may assert its power under Section 19(a)
to define it as a "trade term.' See p. 213, infra.
108. See the discussion on pp. 192 et seq., infra.
109. See the discussion on pp. 198 et seq., infra.
110. See the discussion pp. 185 et seq., supra; Mead, supra note 1, at 433; Dulles, The
Securities Act and Foreign Lending (1933) 12 FOREiGN Ai,Ams 33.
111. § 6(a).
112. § 11(a) (1) and (e).
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Others are made similarly liable even though they do not sign.11 This
liability (as well as the liability of others hereafter considered) is ex-
pressly made to rest upon a "fiduciary relationship" '114 to the investor.
As to parts of the registration statement not purporting to be made on
the authority of an expert and not purporting to be a copy of or extract
from a report or valuation of an expert or public document, such person
must have had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to be-
lieve and belief that the statement was true and involved no material omis-
sions."' As to any part purporting to be made on the authority of an
expert (other than himself) or purporting to be a statement of an official
person or a copy of a public document, he must have had reasonable
ground to believe and did believe that the statements contained no such
untruths or omissions."" And for statements made by such persons as
experts, they must have made a reasonable invetigation and have had
reasonable grounds for believing and did believe the statements to be
true and to contain no material omissions.117  Criticism is frequently
made that the standard is too high. Objection to it, however, cannot
be made in the abstract but only in its particular applications.
To a very limited extent the doctrine is no innovation to the common
law. Courts have on many occasions described directors as occupying a
fiduciary relationship to stockholders," 8 and the doctrine has made genu-
ine advance in recent years following its effective and persuasive pro-
motion by Berle." 9 To all classes of persons liable under Section 11
it is, however, for all practical purposes new.20  Yet it is not so far
in advance of the common law nor so inconsistent with liberal thought
as to be deemed revolutionary. More particularly, however, it is fre-
quently said that the test given injects into the Act a vague and uncertain
formula. This is true. Many states have differing statutes regulating
certain activities of trustees.'' In addition each state has its common
law. If these factors are pertinent to an interpretation of the Act, there
will be at least verbal-and perhaps substantial--differences among the
various courts. 2 2 In essence, however, the Act is setting a high standard
113. Directors, or persons performing similar functions, or partners [§11(a) (2)], and
those named with their consent "as being or about to become" directors, or persons per-
forming similar functions, or partners [§ 11(a) (3)].
114. § 11(c).
115. § 11(b) (3) (A).
116. § 11(b) (3) (C) and (D).
117. § 11(b) (3) (B). See p. 197, infra.
118. E.g., Strong v. Repide, 213 U. S. 419 (1909); Sisk v. Jordan Co., 94 Conn. 384,
101 Atl. 181 (1920).
119. Bele, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust (1931) 44 HEARv. L. REv. 1049.
120. Of course, even as respects directors the common law has never gone so far as to
bold them vicariously liable to investors on such a basis.
121. Collected in Bogert, The Trustee's Duty With Regard to Conversion of Invest-




-an immeasurable difference in degree. It could go farther than it does
and resolve those verbal differences, 123 and that seems desirable.
Under Section 6(a) the issuer's "principal executive officer or officers,
its principal financial officer, its comptroller or principal accounting offi-
cer" must sign. Presumably the Commission, under its power to de-
fine "trade terms,"' 24 will resolve doubts as to the extensiveness of the
category of principal executive officers. 2 5 Since the Commission tech-
nically lacks the power to exempt from signing any person named,'12 6 the
question arises as to whether a statement can be made effective for an
issuer lacking any such officers. In most cases persons could be named
to such offices for the particular purpose, but this would appear a
strange fiction, say, for a protective committee. Of all persons made
liable under the Act, with the possible exception of "experts," the prin-
cipal executive officers seem to be in the most favored position to sus-
tain the burden of proof imposed. 27 While relatively at an advantage,
they assume risks which mount with the size or degree of complexity of
the enterprise. Since, for the most part, it is the large enterprise which
seeks capital from the public and since most large enterprises, especially
in the industrial field, are fairly complex, the penalty imposed on these
employees (who, after all, do not receive the proceeds of the issue) may
well deter some of them from assuming the risk if they are persons of
financial substance. The financial and accounting officers seem to have
been included as the experts responsible for certain phases of the en-
terprise vital to the registration statement, but unlike the other "ex-
perts"'128 contemplated by the Act their liability is not confined to the
123. For example, by codifying the rule as stated in the Restatement of the Law of
Trusts, Draft T. No. 2 (Am. L. Inst. 1931) § 169: "The trustee is under a duty to the
beneficiary in administering the trust to exercise such care and skill as a man of ordinary
prudence would exercise in dealing with his own property; and if the trustee has greater
skill than that of a man of ordinary prudence, he is under a duty to exercise such skill
as he has."
124. §19(a).
125. If the Commission should have failed to rule in a particular case and one person
who might later be held to be one of the "principal executive officers" should have failed to
sign, the question might arise as to whether the registration statement ever became effective.
If it were held not to have become effective on this account, all who "sold" the security
might be absolutely liable under Section 12(1), while the directors, other officers, and some
underwriters might not be unless they were held to "control" the issuer or others who "sold"
§ 153. See note 100, supra, and note 140, infra. As to the applicability of the doctrine
of estoppel to such a situation see p. 214, infra. Perhaps courts would avoid this switching
of liability from Section 11 to Section 12(1) by interpreting "principal executive officer or
officers" to mean that only one is required to sign.
126. See pp. 213, 214, infra.
127. In a great many cases the executive officers, other than those responsible merely for
particular phases of an enterprise, would be expected to maintain fairly intimate contact
with detailed operations and to be in a position to make the investigation which might
prove their only defense in case suit were brought.
128. Cf. § 11(a) (4) ; and see the discussion on p. 197, infra.
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portions of the statement which their positions would qualify them to pass
upon.
1 29
Although only a majority of the board of directors'3" is required to
sign,'131 all directors 132 are made liableW 3 as well as "every person who,
with his consent, 34 is named in the registration statement as being or
about to become a director."' 35 As with the other persons made liable
on the registration statement, the risks to directors increase with the
size or complexity of the issuer's operations. 36 Furthermore, though
there may be some or many directors who do not "direct" (in the sense
that they merely draw prestige and fees from the position) there are a
great many, particularly of the larger and more complicated enterprises,
who do and yet are not personally familiar with all details of operation.
Nor could their services be obtained in most cases if they were required
to investigate details of the enterprise. 7 The experience and judg-
ment of men of affairs is of great value to most of our more important
corporations. To deprive enterprises of this asset would seem un-
economic in view of the slight gains which may be expected. 38  It is
129. Cf. § 11(a) (1).
130. ". . . or persons performing similar functions (or, if there is no board of directors
or persons performing similar functions, by the majority of the persons or board having
the power of management of the issuer)!' § 6(a).
131. Ibid.
132. Or " . . . person performing similar functions, or partner." § 11(a) (2), and (3).
In view of the difference in the description here and in Section 6(a) [note 130, supra], the
question arises as to whether there is any liability imposed upon the minority of "the persons
or board having the power of management of the issuer" in the absence of a board of
directors "or persons performing similar functions" and if such persons are not partners.
133. Directors and other persons (except the issuer) subject to suit under Section 11(a)
are not held liable if they sustain the burden of proof that before the effective date of the
registration they had resigned from and ceased to act in the capacity described in the regis-
tration and had notified the Commission to this effect and that they would not be re-
sponsible. § 11(b) (1). Presumably only directors who did not sign (and possibly "under-
writers") could avoid liability by sustaining the burden of proof that if the part of the
registration statement with respect to which their liability was asserted became effective
without their knowledge they, upon becoming aware of such fact, "forthwith acted and ad-
vised the Commission, in accordance with paragraph (1)" of Section 11(b), "acted" thus
presumably meaning that he bad resigned and ceased to act in the described capacity, "and,
in addition, gave reasonable public notice that such part of the registration statement had
become effective without" their knowledge. § Il(b) (2).
134. The Act does not specifically require the filing of this consent in writing, as it does
in the case of "experts." Cf. § 7.
135. Or " . . . person performing similar functions, or partner." § 11(a) (3).
136. See the discussion on p. 194, supra.
137. Here, as at many other points in the Act, it is tolerably dear that Congress intended
to accomplish certain ends wholly ancillary to the avowed purpose of the Act of requiring
the truth about securities to be given investors "with the least possible interference to
honest business."
138. It is not to be denied that cases where directors have used their position merely
as a social badge or as an advantageous trading position have been far too numerous in
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possible to safeguard the accuracy and completeness of the registration
statement without subjecting every director to the burden of proof that
after reasonable investigation he had reasonable ground for believing and
did believe the registration statement to be free from actionable un-
truths or omissions.
One cannot foretell with certainty whether principal executive officers
and directors, as such, may be subject, as those who "control" the issuer,
to liability under Section 15 as well as under Section 11. They certainly
are in a position to exercise the highest degree of immediate "control,"
though if this type of "control" is contemplated in Section 15 many of
the provisions of Section 11 respecting such persons become meaning-
less.139  If on the authority of Section 15 they are joined with an issuer
in a suit brought under Section 11, they are deprived of all defenses
specified in Section 11(b). 110 By virtue of Section 15, however, the so-
called "dummy" director is cast aside and those are held liable who tell
him how to act and what to do.
Another, though perhaps a relatively minor, effect upon directors
(and, more particularly, upon other officers and employees) is the risk
they may incur in selling securities which they own and which were
originally issued' by the corporation or other "person" by whom they
are employed. If any person who purchased from or sold for them is
held to have so purchased or sold with a view to "distribution," such
person would become an "underwriter" if the officers or employees may
be said to have been directly or indirectly "controlled" by the issuer.1
4 2
Unless the security were registered Section 5 would be violated.
the past. It is also not to be denied that adequate regulatory legislation is needed for the
protection of the corporation and the minorities in such cases. It is doubtful, however, if
that end has any dominant place in a securities act. Legislation could be more effectively
designed to accomplish the other purpose if considered separately. In that way it is be-
lieved that a more effective control over the many different malpractices would be realized.
139. Section 15 obviously is drawn with little reference to the many different situations in
which it may apply. Until courts round out its meaning by an accretion of decisions, the
risks must remain uncertain.
140. The wording of Section 15 is not sufficiently clear to permit one to state whether
a "controlling" person may be sued independently of, and prior to'a judgment against, the
person "controlled." Although the "controlling" person is made "jointly and severally" liable,
it is "with and to the same extent as" the person controlled. Doubt also exists as to whether
a person made liable only under Section 15 would have a right of contribution under Section
11(f) against other persons made liable, since Section 11(f) refers specifically to persons
made liable under that section.
141. The issue may have been "sold or disposed of by the issuer" [§3(a) (1)] long be-
fore July 27, 1933, but the sale by or for the employee might be held to be a "new offer-
ing" [§3(a) (1)] not exempt from Section 5 by Section 4(1) because of the presence of
"underwriting" [§ 2(11)], even though the "offering" were not "public."




Specific provision is made for certification of parts of the registration
statement by experts such as accountants, engineers and appraisers whose
professions give authority to their statements. 43 The written consent
of experts named as having prepared or certified such parts is required
to be filed with the registration statement. 4 This results in making
such an expert liable for the whole issue"4 if untruths or omissions creat-
ing liability under Section 11 occur in the part of the statement which he
is named as preparing or certifying. 46 Experts named as having pre-
pared or certified *"any report or valuation" which is "used in connection
with the registration statement" also are made similarly liable if they
are so named with their consent.' 47  As to such experts, however, the
Commission is empowered to waive the filing of their written consent; 
4
1
and if their written consent is not so filed, they are not made liable unless
the person suing can prove that such consent was in fact given, though
it was not so filed. 49
Of all those made liable on the registration statement the "expert" is
in the least vulnerable position. He is not made liable unless the part
of the statement which he prepares or certifies contains a material untruth
or omission.Y-° Furthermore the reports of experts in practically all
143. § 7. The Commission probably has power under Section 19(a) to define which
professions give such authority. Upon such rulings may depend the ability of issuers to
have every material fact in the registration statement prepared by an "expert." See note
16S, infra.
144. § 7.
145. § 11(a) (4) and (e). Experts are given a right of contribution under Section
11 (f), but it would probably only be enforceable against the issuer, and any person controlling
the issuer [§ 15], unless the experts could controvert the proof advanced by others that they
had reasonable ground to believe his statements to be true and complete. See p. 180, supra
If the untruths or omissions are willful, they become subject to criminal liability under Sec-
tions 17(a) and 24.
146. If such untruths or omissions occur only in a part so prepared or certified, any
person made liable under Section 11, other than the issuer, those controlling the issuer, and
the expert involved, is relieved from sustaining the burden of proof that his reasonable ground
for belief and his belief in the truth and adequacy of the statements was based upon an
investigation which would be reasonable for a person in a fiduciary capacity. He must,
however, sustain the burden of proof that he had reasonable ground for believing and belief
"that such part of the registration statement fairly represented the statement of the expert
or was a fair copy of or extract from the report or valuation of the expert"; and that the
statement contained no such untruths or omissions. Cf. § 11(b) (3) (A) and (C).
147. §§ 7 and 11(a) (4).
143. If it is "impracticable" or involves "undue hardship on the person filing the registra-
tion statement." § 7.
149. § 11(a) (4). Suit in such cases would be highly improbable in view of the diffi-
culty of sustaining such proof.
150. If that part does contain such an untruth or omission, the expert must sustain the
burden of proof that "he had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe
1933]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
cases are based on some form of investigation, and the standard of
care probably would equal, though not exceed, that for their profes-
sion. Nevertheless the Act may make it impossible for accountants
to obtain protection from their statements under the cloak of a limited
certification.'' To say the least the Act goes as far in protection of pur-
chasers of securities as plaintiff in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche"'5 un-
successfully urged the New York Court of Appeals to go in the protection
of a creditor.' The change whicl that court thought so "revolutionary"
as to be "wrought by legislation" '54 has been made. And the duty placed
on experts such as accountants has not been measured by the expert's re-
lation to his employer but by his service to investors. 5
The hesitancy of reputable and substantial persons to be named as
"experts" could result only from fear of the heavy penalties which might
attend an error or which might be imposed by an unintended construc-
tion of their statements by a jury. Nevertheless it may be expected
that the reputable firms will be more chary than ever of becoming ex-
perts for any but the more substantial issuers. And it may be predicted
that the fees of these experts will measurably increase, at least until
greater experience has been gained from litigation under the section,
since many uncertainties remain-some necessarily so. May an account-
ant rely upon an appraiser's certificate, where it does or where it does
not contain qualifications? May he rely upon an officer's certificate of
inventory? In a financial statement, what falls within the realm of fact,
what within the realm of opinion?
Underwriters
Where the Companies Act holds responsible in addition to directors
and certain promoters only such persons as "authorise.d the issue of the
prospectus," 6 the Securities Act imposes liability upon all "under-
writers."'6" The introduction into the Act of the business term "un-
and did believe" the statements to be true and complete, or that "such part of the regis-
tration statement did not fairly represent his statement as an expert or was not a fair copy
of or extract from his report or valuation . . ." § 11(b) (3) (B).
151. Section 11(c) provides that in determining what constitutes "reasonable investiga-
tion and reasonable ground for belief, the standard of reasonableness shall be that required
of a person occupying a fiduciary relationship." See the discussion on p. 193, supra. If
a limited certification should be held to protect an expert, it seems that those other than
experts who are made liable would not be relieved of sustaining the burden of proof that
they had made a reasonable investigation of the statements not so certified by the expert.
152. 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931).
153. In view of the standard of a fiduciary imposed by Section 11(c) it goes further.
154. Supra note 152, at 187, 174 N. E. at 447.
155. See id. at 188-189, 174 N. E. at 448. By virtue of Section 16, however, there still
remains the expert's liability for fraud.
156. Supra note 27, § 37.
157. § 11(a) (5).
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derwriter" necessitated definition, and the definition employed""s in-
cludes many more persons than have hitherto been comprehended in that
term." 9 Those persons actually play a variety of r~les whose dif-
ferences are quite marked in business. For example, the underwriter
who originates the issue and typically manages its distribution occupies
an essentially different position with respect to the security, the pros-
pectus, and the issuer than do those other persons who may be considered
as underwriters or who are so considered under the Act.'6°
With reference to the Act this difference is founded upon ability to
make the "reasonable investigation" required of a fiduciary.16' In orig-
inating security issues honest and competent houses make such investi-
158. § 2(11).
159. Underwriting has been defined as "an agreement entered into before the shares are
brought before the public, that in the event of the public not taking up the whole of them,
or the number mentioned in the agreement, the underwriter will, for an agreed commission,
take an allotment of such part of the shares as the public has not applied for." In re
Licensed Victuallers' Mutual Trading Association, 42 Ch. D. 1 (1889). The Standard Dic-
tionary follows this definition; Webster's extends it to include agreements for outright
purchase. Berle explains this extension as the adoption of the definition of "American
financial slang." See New York Times, June 4, 1933, VIII-1. Like other slang its defini-
tions are not fixed and invariable. As sometimes used the term is confined to "originating
houses" or again- to "principal underwriters" or members of an "original purchase group."
At its furthest extension it has included all "selling syndicate" members, but in so far as is
known it has not been applied to members of "selling groups," though at times their practical
commitments are scarcely to be differentiated. But even its broadest usage does not en-
compass all those included under the Act-such, for example, as the small retail dealer who
solicits and confirms orders in a security for an issuer at a small commission without taking
any commitment in the security. That explanation may cover the inclusion of any person
who "has purchased" from an issuer rather than a restriction to persons who technically
underwrite, but it does not make clear how any person that "sells for an issuer" is included.
160. For a more extended discussion of the various functions of "underwriters," see
Douglas and Bates, Some Effects of the Securities Act Upon Investment Banking (1933)
1 U. or CincAco L. Rmv. 283. As a practical matter a prospective issuer of securities usually
deals with but one investment banker, except as the issuer may technically contract with a
greater number at the instance of that banker. It is the function of such a banker, known
as the "originating house" with respect to the security involved, to investigate the issuer
and the market to determine whether the proposed or some lesser credit or capital invest-
ment is warranted and what form it should take. Realistically, there is great variation in
the weight given the factors entering into such a judgment, but the important point here is
that the originating house is in a peculiarly strategic position to investigate and weigh them.
Furthermore, in the course of subsequent negotiations, the originating house has the oppor-
tunity to influence decision as to the precise form the security will take, the protective pro-
visions with which it will be hedged, and the time, price, and conditions in respect of its
offering, including the form of prospectus employed therein. If the size or nature of the
issue and the relative capital or distributing capacity of the originating house necessitate, or
factors affecting the issuer or banker make it desirable, other houses may be called upon
to participate in the underwriting and/or distribution of the security. Typically the originat-
ing house acts as manager of such groups or syndicates as are thus formed, and if there
are co-managers acts as agent for such managers for purposes of centralized administration.
161. § 11(a) (5), (b) (3) (A), and (c).
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gations and are compensated therefor. They normally assist in the
preparation of the prospectus and lend their names to the issue. Un-
der the Act they are assigned no special responsibility, however, which
would differentiate them from a host of other persons far removed
from the origination of the issue.162 It is not strange that originating
houses should be held to the standard of responsibility imposed by the
Act. It is, however, anomalous to find that many other persons are held
to as high a standard, even though they are in no position to duplicate
the investigatory function of the originator or to participate in his
activities. In one particular, however, the originating house is set
apart from others who may become "underwriters," inasmuch as "pre-
liminary negotiations or agreements between an issuer and any under-
writer" are exempt.163  The failure to provide similar exemption for ne-
gotiations and agreements among underwriters6 will hamper the orig-
162. It has been suggested (see Douglas and Bates, supra note 160, at 284-86] that in the
performance of his functions of origination the originator, as such, incurs no liability under
the Act. This is a highly theoretical point, for in practically all cases the originating house
would subsequently share in the purchase or underwriting of the security originated and,
in any event, might be held under the sweeping provision of Section 2 (11) which includes
as an "underwriter" any person who "participates or has a direct or indirect participation
in any such undertaking," depending upon the interpretation of the term "participation."
But it is as an "underwriter," not as an originator, that the originating house comes within
the purview of the Act. In addition, of course, he may be liable where his name is used
as giving authority to any statements made in the registration statement [§ 11(a) (4) and
(b) (3) (B) (I) and (II)] or where he controls the issuer, its officers, or experts. §§ 11(a)
(2), 15.
163. § 2(3). This exemption only applies to the definition of "sale." It may mean,
however, that preliminary negotiations between issuers and "underwriters" are exempt only
if the issuer approaches the "underwriters." No such exemption is made with respect
to an "offer to buy." Still such offer is expressly made unlawful under Section 5(a) if a
registration statement is not in effect. Violation of that section would entail civil liability
under Section 12(1) if such offer were included in the definition of "sale" and possible crim-
inal liability under Sections 17 and 24 whether or not it were so included. See Douglas and
Bates, supra note 160, at 288 et seq. But mere solicitation of business by an issuer would
not be considered the making of an offer to buy unless the undefined "buy" were inter-
preted in the same way and as broadly as its correlative "sell." If it should be so inter-
preted, the same exemption might be carried over to such an instance.
164. The requirement that the names of, and certain facts with respect to, underwriters
be given in the registration statement [Sch. A (5), (7), (16), (17), and (28) and Sch. B
(6), (10), and (13)] would mean that only such underwriters could be included as had
dealt directly with the issuer, and that sub-underwriters could not be approached prior to
the effective date of the registration statement. Their acceptance of participations would
require amendment to the registration statement and possibly further delay before the
statement again became effective as amended. Considerable delay might also occur between
the offering and acceptance of such sub-underwritings. Cf. Section 12 (d) of the Senate
Amendment to H. R. 5480 exempting "Any preliminary negotiations between the issuers, un-
derwriters, or other persons necessary to preparing an issue of securities for registration
under this Act or for sale to the public after registration." It is unfortunate that some sim-
ilar provision was not included in the bill as passed. The word "preliminary" should have
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inating house in forming groups to underwrite a commitment for the
issue.16
One other possible function of the originating house is also affected.
Since it is most prominently identified with and sponsors the issue, it
usually accepts some measure of responsibility for keeping watch over
the security and the affairs of the issuer with a view to representing the
interests of security holders in the event of difficulties, impending or
actual. The liabilities and deterrents imposed by the Act on those per-
forming this function provide a real impediment, whether they be orig-
inators or wholly independent groups. 6
As has been noted, numerous persons other than originators are made
liable on the registration statement as "underwriteys" to the same ex-
tent as the originating house. A few of them, sometimes denominated
as the "principal underwriters," may be in nearly as strategic a position
to investigate and to dictate the form of the registration statement as
the originators. Most others who might fall within the category of "un-
derwriter" would have no such opportunity. 16 7  Thus with respect to
security distribution all members of purchase and banking groups and
selling syndicates are so made liable. Few of the fifty to several hun-
dred widely scattered members of syndicates underwriting large issues
would have sufficiently large participations to justify making the investi-
gation required.' 6 Sound underwriting requires that the risk be so
prevented the evasion of federal jurisdiction evidently feared by the draftsmen of the
present Act if other provisions therein are not adequate to the purpose.
165. See Douglas and Bates, supra note 160, at 288 et seq. There would seem to be a
possibility, however, that the originating house might be employed as the agent of the issuer
in approaching potential "underwriters."
166. See discussion p. 191, infra.
167. For an elaboration of this point see Douglas and Bates, supra note 160, at 290 et seq.
168. The possibility of all who might become "underwriters" jointly employing an agent
to investigate, thus preserving in such formal way the existing division of functions as
between originating houses and participants, is probably precluded by the failure of the
Act to exempt preliminary negotiations among underwriters. If means or instruments of
the mails or of transportation or communication in interstate commerce were used, Section
5 would be violated. If the violation were willful a criminal penalty would be risked, but
of greater practical importance is the fact that if the negotiations resulted in participation
by such other "underwriters," the person (other than the issuer) approaching them with
respect to the security would be liable to suit under Section 12(1) any time within two
years thereafter [§ 13] for damages or rescission, and the action would need show no
causation between what the person violating Section 5 (whether willfully or not) said or
did and what happened to the security. Cf., however, the discussion of damages at p. 177,
supra.
A method of obviating this technical difficulty by making the originating house the
agent of the issuer has been mentioned. See note 165, supra. Another method of meeting
the difficulty would be for the issuer to employ "experts" to verify every fact in the regis-
tration statement, so that the entire statement would be purely a compilation of signed
reports. But the "underwriters" would still be required to prove, not only belief in the
truth and adequacy of the statements, but "reasonable ground" for so believing. Presumably
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spread that all who participate will be able to bear it conservatively.
Since such ability of individual underwriters is not unlimited many *mall
participations are implicit, especially for large issues. Economy is
achieved by delegating to the originating house the function of investi-
gation, not of the exercise of judgment upon the facts investigated. If
it was the design of Congress to assure accuracy and completeness in the
registration statement by multiplying the number of investigations, it
lost sight not only of this but of other costs entailed.169
Specifically excluded from the definition of "underwriter" are those
"whose interest is limited to a commission from an underwriter or dealer
not in excess of the usual and customary distributors' or sellers' commis-
sion."170  This exemption is ambiguous. Perhaps it applies only to
regularly employed commission salesmen or those acting in a similar ca-
pacity with no greater interest in the transaction.' But it probably
applies also to dealers who without commitment merely confirm sales for
an "underwriter or dealer.'1 2  The moot question 73 is whether this
exemption includes dealers who do not underwrite in the technical sense
this would call for investigation and knowledge of the integrity and competence of the ex-
perts and even for some verification of the experts' reports, especially where the experts
were not passing upon routine legal, accounting, or engineering facts. Otherwise such copious
use of experts would be too obvious a dodge.
169. A person of financial substance would scarcely assume the risk of civil liability
involved in becoming an "underwriter" without making the sort of investigation which
would be his only certain defense. If his participation were no more than $10,000 to
$100,000 with a gross spread of from $300 to $4,000, out of which he would have to
cover his overhead, pay direct expenses and commissions, set aside a reserve for unsuccess-
ful underwritings, derive a profit, and in addition finance an investigation similar to that
which might be undertaken by the originating house, it is obvious that he would not partici-
pate. To increase the gross profit of all participants sufficiently so that such investigation
might be made would make the cost of financing prohibitive. One result might be that
security distribution would fall into the hands of financially irresponsible houses. This
would not only be directly inimical to the interests of investors, but would place all the
real burden of underwriting back upon the issuer. Another possibility would be that
only small or moderate issues of issuers close to financial centers would be underwritten.
170. § 2(11).
171. If so, it is curious that similar exemption was not extended to salesmen who might
be employed on a commission basis by an issuer. Perhaps it was the intent of Congress
that if the issuer used the customary methods and channels of security distribution an
"underwriter" should be interposed to provide an independent check on the issue. The
breadth of the definition of "underwriter" would defeat the essence of such a purpose,
however, for any person who "sells for an issuer" is as much an "underwriter" as a person
of independent financial substance.
172. This is the interpretation being acted upon in some cases. The failure to provide
similar exemption for persons so distributing for issuers, however, has led to the device
of setting up an "underwriter" in the nature of a strawman between the issuer and such
dealers. See note 171, supra.
173. It is hardly possible that "distributors" would be interpreted as being synonymous
with "underwriters," otherwise the impact of Section 11 would be only upon "underwriters"
who received more than a normal commission.
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but who subscribe for securities in advance of firm orders from cus-
tomers. 1' 4  Strict interpretation would hold them to be "underwriters.'
7
7
Dealer discounts from the public offering price usually are (and certainly,
in view of this possible exemption, would be) denominated "commis-
sions," however, and the reference in Section 4(1) to th6 "unsold allot-
ment to or subscription by" a "dealer" may sometime be relied upon
as evidence that Congress intended their exemption.176  In any event,
few of them would be in a position to sustain the burden of proof re-
quired of "underwriters," though their opportunity would probably be
as great as for most such "underwriters."
In fact it is curious to find in the Act an exemption for those who
will actually represent the security to investors when others who may
merely guarantee its sale are made liable. Although a person who
"purchased" with no view to "distribution'177 is not directly included
as an "underwriter," he is if he "participates or has a direct or indirect
participation in any such undertaking," with the result that, if any other
"purchaser" should have, or should be held to have had, such a motive,
he is made liable on the registration statement.
"Participation" is not defined. If "participants" are held to be only
the signers of a joint agreement, the attempt of strict underwriters (not
having a view to distribution) to escape liability by signing agreements
distinct from those made by persons having a view to distribution would
be unavailing, because of the further inclusion of any person who "par-
174. Cf. Douglas and Bates, supra note 160, at 297, 302.
175. This view would be strengthened if the intent of Congress in including "under-
writers" among those made liable on the registration statement were assumed to be for
the purpose of placing responsibility upon those having strong incentives to sell, and if
it were assumed that the presence of an inventory or a commitment (confirmed subscrip-
tion) entailing risk of loss as well as opportunity for profit was such an incentive while the
mere opportunity for a "normal" profit was not. Strict adherence to such a theory would
lead courts to hold as "underwriters" those dealers who, though not members of selling
groups, purchase at the small "dealers' concession" from selling group members in advance
of customer orders. Courts might discriminate, however, between members and non-
members of selling groups, or between those who did and did not agree to sell on such
terms. But as to the actual intent of Congress, see H. R. REP. 85, op. cit. supra note 3,
at 13-14.
176. The use of the term "dealer" at that point in Section 4 (1) is unfortunate. If
the intent of Congress was to except from the exemption there provided only transactions
by an underwriter, whether or not any longer acting as such with respect to the security
involved, it would have been much clearer to have so stated, rather than to use the
term "such dealer" which in its context includes both a "dealer" and an "underwriter no
longer acting as an underwriter." That this might have been the intent may be inferred
from the inclusion in that clause of the term "issuer." Presumably an allotment by an
issuer to a dealer would make the latter an "underwriter," as Section 2 (11) provides no
exemption in such a case. See note 172, supra.
177. § 2(11). "Distribution" is not defined. Presumably it might apply to either
private or public "sales" in lots smaller than the bulk purchase, or even to a bulk sale made
within a short time after the purchase.
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ticipates or has a participation in the direct or indirect underwriting of
any such undertaking." It is possible, however, that such a holding
would permit an investor to make an outright purchase from an issuer
of a portion of an issue being "underwritten" without himself becoming
an "underwriter." There is no certainty as to such a holding, however,
and unwary persons who never contemplated such a r6le may find them-
selves held as "underwriters.' 78
Other persons who are not commonly considered as underwriters or
security dealers likewise may become "underwriters" under the Act.
Those who, in connection with a reorganization179 or some other plan of
a protective committee, solicit, even gratuitously, the deposits of securities
in exchange for certificates of deposit may become "underwriters.'
80
There would normally be no other "underwriters" for whom they might
act, so that the exception in Section 2(11) would not apply, even if
they were not acting gratuitously. They would be "selling" for an
issuer under Section 2(11) in view of the broad definition of "sale"
in Section 2 (3).1
Two additional factors will seriously affect orthodox underwriting.
The "waiting period" of twenty or more days prior to the effective date
of a registration statement82 will probably result in such underwriting
178. Under § 11. Query, under Section 2 (11), whether an investor buying from an
issuer securities neither publicly offered nor otherwise underwritten, and so not registered,
might not, if agencies of interstate commerce or the mails were used and the transaction
did not come within Section 5(c), be held to be an "underwriter" if some other buyer
should be held to have had a view to distribution in making the purchase. Note that
transactions by him as an "underwriter" would not be exempt under Section 4(1). The
two-year risk of such decisions to the issuer and its officers under Section 12 (1) may
deter even private offerings except those of a purely intrastate character.
179. Section 4 (3) does not exempt securities issued in a reorganization if the reorganiza-
tion is not "bona fide" or if it is not under court "supervision." Furthermore, even in cases
of such "supervision," deposit usually occurs prior to such reorganization or supervision,
and, in any event, the exemption probably applies only to securities issued by the corpora-
tion being reorganized, not to certificates of deposit issued by others. This is the inter-
pretation accepted by the Federal Trade Commission in preparation of its forms Nos.
D-1 and D-2.
180. At least, they run the risk of such an interpretation.
181. See the discussion p. 207, infra.
182. § 8(a). "The effective date of a registration statement shall be the twentieth day
after the filing thereof." But this may be delayed through amendments or stop orders.
§ 8(b), (c) and (d). Statements on certain foreign securities may become effective in seven
days. § 8(a). In the Statement of the Manager on the part of the House, the twenty-day
period was explained as providing time sufficient for public scrutiny, while the Commis-
sion is expected during this period to make only a "preliminary check-up." See H. R. REP.
85, op. cit. supra note 3, at 20. Undoubtedly this provision will be useful administratively
in permitting the Commission to prevent some patent violations.
The "waiting period" was also included for other than administrative reasons. H. R.
RFP. 85, op. cit. supra note 3, at 7-8, states, "It contemplates a change from methods of
distribution lately in vogue which attempted complete sale of an issue sometimes within
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being postponed until some time after that date. Such "underwriting"
as may be necessary to bring the "underwriters" int6 the registration
statement will probably be so hedged that the issuer will bear the risk
of sale prior to the effective date of .the statement, or commissions paid
underwriters will be considerably increased to cover their added risks.ls'
The value of such a provision may prove to make its cost in correlative
effects too high.'84
The other factor is the "stop order" which may be issued by the Com-
mission suspending the effectiveness of a registration statement.8 5 Pre-
sumably all "underwriter" and dealer commitments will provide for re-
purchase by the issuer in the event a stop order should issue, for other-
wise they might be left for a period with unsaleable inventory, and might
even have no other recourse against the issuer."" Limited capital rela-
one day or at most a few days. Such methods practically compelled minor distributors,
dealers, and even salesmen, as the price of participation in future issues of the underwriting
house involved, to make commitments blindly." If "participation in future issues" is
valuable and is to be obtained in no other way, commitments will still be made, though
perhaps not so "blindly." Other factors, such as liabilities imposed, may induce caution
or fear of commitments. On the other hand the provision may prevent certain commit-
ments which are predicated upon little more than the lure of the unknown. But even
this is highly questionable. In periods of rising security prices and consequent opportunity
for speculative profit there probably will be oversubscription based on unknowns which
the registration statement will not dispel. More than twenty days of falling prices are
usually required to dispel such hopes. Security dealers, like other merchants, can seldom
successfully resist the tide of popular demand or lure for profit.
As for the investor, furthermore, there is little likelihood that issuers or "underwriters"
who did not consider that their securities would pass the test of a twenty-day scrutiny
would make the prospectus available to prospective buyers much in advance of actual
solicitation. In fact, there may be considerable risk in any issuer or "underwriter" so doing
[under Sections 12 (1) and 24, because of violation of Section 5 when read in connection
with Section 2 (3)], though an official of the Commission has ruled otherwise. Release
No. 70, Nov. 6, 1933, quoting H. R. REP. 85, op. cit. supra note 3, at 12-13. In practice
few investors of the type supposedly most needing protection would undertake the initiative
and expense of obtaining transcripts of registration statements. As to cost see Regulations,
Art. 9. Perhaps better for the immediate protection of investors than the waiting period is
the power granted to the Commission to require the filing with it of prospectuses used in
connection with the sale of registered securities. § 10(d). Scrutiny of such prospectuses
reinforced by the grant of injunctive relief [§ 20] may be of real value in protecting
investors.
183. Cf. note 164, supra, for a further difficulty in connection with the waiting period
introduced by the failure to exempt preliminary negotiations among underwriters. The
bringing in of sub-underwriters will require amendment of the registration statement and
indeterminate delay beyond the original twenty days. § 8(c). Some question arises as to
whether a change in the public offering price necessitates an "amendment" under Section
8(a) or (c). It is probably not required, judging from the wording of Schedules A (16)
and B (9) and from Art. 17(a) of the Rules and Regulations of the Commission published
July 6, 1933.
184. Cf. note 182, supra.
185. § 8(b), (d), and (e). See discussion p. 212, infra.
186. A stop order might issue under Section 8(e) because of the refusal of the issuer
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tive to the size of repeated underwriting requirements and the greater
profit in turnovet than in investment should lead security merchants, as
other merchants, to minimize the risks of frozen inventory, except as they
may obtain adequate compensation for assuming them.
Dealers
Dealers are subject to regulation under the Act and incur new risks,
apart from their intentional 87 or unwitting participation 8 8 in security
issues as "underwriters." The definition of "dealer" is so broad, further-
more, that in the absence of a fairly uniform "rule of reason" many in-
vestors and investing institutions may be included. 89
Brokers are specifically included as "dealers." 9 0 In one instance;
however, they are distinguished from other "dealers."'' Their trans-
actions executed in the market upon customers' orders without solicita-
tion are exempt from Section 5, so that any security involved need not
be registered nor need the prospectus requirement be met. If a broker
solicits orders'92 or buys or sells for his "own" account, 93 he is not dif-
ferentiated from other "dealers." Whether in a strictly brokerage trans-
action he is subject to liability under Section 12(2) is uncertain. That
section applies to "any person who sells a security." " ' Under the con-
or some underwriter to permit an examination by the Commission, but it would not
be sufficient ground for rescission. Presumably, however, the Commission would follow
its stop order in such a case with an application for a writ of mandamus under Section
20(c), so that the stop order would eventually be lifted or the issuer and possibly others
would be made liable under Section 11. But in the meantime the capital of the wholly
innocent "underwriters" and dealers in the security would be frozen.
187. See p. 202, supra.
188. See p. 203, supra.
189. § 2 (12). The definition includes "any person who engages either for all or part of
his time, directly or indirectly, as agent, broker, or principal, in the business of offering,
buying, selling, or otherwise dealing or trading in securities issued by another person."
Except in the light of other definitions of the term it might be difficult to extricate from
this classification many management investment trusts, insurance companies and some
individual investors, as well as most speculators. Persons who solicit business for insur-
ance companies are possibly included, since the definition of "security" is sufflciently broad
to include them. § 2 (1). This inference is supported by the exemption of such contracts
from registration. § 3 (8).
190. § 2(12).
191. § 4(2).
192. The Act does not define "solicitation." Probably the line between mere acceptance
of orders and solicitation must always be vague. Brokers should have little difficulty in
avoiding this borderline, however, and they may further minimize their risks of suit by
more careful selection of those with whom they do business.
193. Cf. Bates and Douglas, Secondary Distribution of Securities-Some Problems Sug-
gested by Kinney v. Glenny (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 949; Douglas and Bates, Stock "Brokers"
as Agents and Dealers (1933) 43 YAm L. J. 46.
194. Other than those securities exempt under Section 3(a) (2).
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mon law a broker was held not to "sell,""19 but in the Act "sell" is de-
fined so broadly' as to include certain activities of brokers. Subject
to the exceptions listed below it would seem unlikely that a broker would
be liable under Section 12(2) for statements made to a customer where
he acts as agent for the customer in buying or selling the security. In
such instances the broker probably does not "sell" the security to the
customer. 7 The risk is heightened if he makes a "solicitation of an
offer to buy," for that falls within the definition of "sell." And if the
broker acts for both seller and purchaser in the same transaction the
provisions of Section 12(2) will probably apply to any statement made
to the purchasers, since it seems likely that he will be deemed to make
them as broker for the seller. And if the broker acts for a seller and
makes statements to the purchaser or to the broker of the purchaser,
Section 12 (2) probably applies. In any event the answers depend upon
the meaning of the words "person purchasing such security." Pur-
chase may or may not be held to be used as a correlative of "sell" as
defined in the Act.
The question has been raised whether a dealer may do more than
confirm orders for "underwriters" without himself becoming an "under-
writer."' If a dealer, even though not held to be an "underwriter"
by so participating, acquires an allotment of securities "as a participant
in the distribution of such securities by the issuer or by or through an
underwriter,"'9 9 it is unlawful for him to "sell" or deliver such securities
(if not exempt under Section 3) by means of interstate commerce or of
the mails unless a registration statement is in effect and unless the de-
livery of such securities by such means is preceded or accompanied by
a prospectus meeting the requirements of Section 10.200 If the effective-
ness of a registration statement should be suspended while the dealer has
unsold inventory, he may have recourse under Section 11 against the
issuer or others made liable on the registration statement. But lacking
that201 he may dispose of the unsold inventory only in intrastate com-
merce and without use of the mails. If a registration is in effect he must
195. Cf. Douglas and Bates, supra note 193, 43 YALE L. J. at 50-53.
196. § 2(3). ". . . every contract of sale or disposition of, attempt or offer to dispose
of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value ..."
197. The broker's liability may or may not be imposed accordingly as courts do or do
not interpret the undefined term "purchasing" in Section 12 (2) as the correlative of "selling."
198. See the discussion p. 202, and notes 175, 176, supra. An "underwriter" may incur
risks under Section 12 (2) as a dealer as well as those peculiar to his position as "under-
writer."
199. § 4(1).
200. § 5. It is likewise unlawful for him to make use of any such means to transmit
a prospectus relating to a registered security unless it meets the requirements of Section
10. § 5(b) (1).
201. Cf. note 186, supra.
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be able to furnish prospectuses meeting the requirements of Section
102'0 as long as he sells "securities constituting the whole or a part of
an unsold allotment" in the distribution." 3 If he has not sold all his
allotment or subscription within thirteen months after the effective date
of the registration statement, he must be in a position to supply new
information for his prospectus.0 4
Assuming the dealer not to be an "underwriter," however, civil liabil-
ity on the prospectus arises only under Section 12. Thus as to material
untruths or omissions under Section 12 (2) the standard applied is merely
that of "reasonable care. ' 2°5 Presumably the dealer might rely on the
registration statement during the thirteen months following its effec-
tive date. To sustain the burden of proof placed on him, however, he
would probably have to compare carefully with the registration state-
ment any prospectus he used. The dealer might also be safe in relying
upon the annual report of the issuer for subsequent information. Annual
reports might be satisfactory for financial statements, though even these
might not be in the form required, and would not be apt to include other
of the statements needed. Under Section 12(1) a prospectus need only
fail to conform in any particular to the requirements of Section 10 to
subject the dealer to absolute liability. Thus, with respect to a pros-
pectus used more than thirteen months after the effective date of the
registration, the omission of the "dates of and parties to, and the general
effect concisely stated" of any "material contract made, not in the or-
dinary course of business" more than twelve months 206 prior to the issue
of the prospectus would subject the dealer to liability to the person pur-
chasing from him. The dealer would have no defenses. He would have
no recourse against the issuer under the Act if the contract were made
after the effective date of the registration statement. Obviously suits
against dealers on transactions during the year or more 07 following the
effective date of the registration and thereafter against dealers selling
unsold allotments will be brought under Section 12(1) rather than
Section 12 (2).0s
Even though a dealer is not "selling" part of an unsold allotment
(and may never have participated in the distribution) his transactions
202. § 5(b).
203. § 4(1).
204. § 10(b) (1). See discussion, p. 207, supra.
205. The burden is placed on the dealer, however, to prove "that he did not know, and
in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission." The
standard of reasonableness is not here defined as in Section 11(c) and presumably is some-
what less exacting. It will also vary, presumably, with the position occupied by the
vendor.
206. § 10(b) (1); Sch. A(24).
207. Cf. note 209, inlra.




are subject to Section 5 for "one year after the last date upon which
the security was bona fide offered to the public by the issuer or by or
through an underwriter (excluding in the computation of such year any
time during which a stop order issued under Section 8 is in effect as to
the security)."9 During such a period he must be in a position to
furnish prospectuses meeting the requirements of Section 10. A regis-
tration statement must be in effect if he is to "sell"21 by means of in-
terstate commerce or of the mails.211 By negative implication, however,
a dealer's transactions in securities privately offered are not subject to
Section 5 even within the year following the offering. 2
In making statements"' in connection with the sale of any security,
other than those of the United States government, states, municipalities,
and banks exempt under Section 12(2), plaintiff not proving lack of
knowledge of such untruths or omissions, he must be able, as noted
209. § 4 (1). This date is extremely vague and its uncertainty involves great hazard
for dealers prior to definitive and uniform interpretation by the courts. The risk continues as
long as unsold securities of the registered issue remain in the hands of the issuer or "under-
writers"--and for one year thereafter.
210. It would also be unlawful for him to "offer to buy" [§ S(a) (1)], but the only
liability would be a criminal one under Section 24 if the violation were willful, for the
vendor is given no rights under Section 12 (1). But see note 163, supra.
211. The "dealer" will be placed in a curious position with respect to securities whose
issuance is exempt from registration under Section 4 (3), since the securities themselves are
not exempt. Because of the liabilities invoked by registration most such issues would not, in
view of the exemption, be registered unless either underwriting were required or the am-
biguity of the exemptions were considered such as to make risky the failure to register.
Thus dealers who inadvertently acquire unregistered securities issued "to the existing security
holders or other existing creditors of a corporation in the process of a bona fide reorganiza-
tion of such corporation under the supervision of any court" § 4 (3)] will be unable to
sell them by means of interstate commerce or of the mails during the year or more following
the issuance of those securities. But see the recent announcement that such securities are
exempt. Note 60, supra.
An innocent dealer may be held liable under Section 12 (1), furthermore, if he should
acquire and sell securities which are discovered within two years to have been "under-
written" and sold less than a year prior to his acquisition by any person who may be held
to have been in control of the issuer, or under control of, or in common control with, the
issuer. § 2 (11). He would, however, have a right of action against the person from
whom he purchased, but he would run the risk that a judgment against such a person
might be worthless and that more than two years might have elapsed between the time of
his purchase and the time when he would bring suit. Unless a dealer traces back for a
year or more the title to every security acquired and determines the status of every vendor
he will not be protected from this risk, for such securities usually would not be differen-
tiated from others of the same issue outstanding. By reason of this difficulty of tracing
title, however, such suits would probably be infrequent.
212. § 4 (1).
213. One of the greatest dangers to dealers under Section 12 (2) will arise through
their use of salesmen, since this subsection applies to oral statements as well as to prospec-
tuses. If their salesmen make any oral statements it may be exceedingly difficult for dealers




above," 4 to sustain the burden of proof that as respects untrue state-
ments or omissions he did not know,"15 and in the exercise of reasonable
care could not have known, of them. In addition to the civil liabilities
imposed, dealers are subject to criminal penalties for willful violations
of the Act or of "rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission
under authority thereof.""1 6 Section 17, which provides a basis for




From the foregoing description three general observations can be
made. (1) There are many uncertainties and obscurities in the Act.
Hence the ultimate interpretation as to its scope or applicability to many
transactions and individuals is of necessity unpredictable. (2) Once a
transaction is held to fall within the Act the nature and extent of liability
remain uncertain. And (3) the effect of the Act on future financing,
conditioned as it is on so many imponderable factors, remains unknown.
But this much is certain. A large group of businesses today want as-
surances which counsel cannot give. To those who want such assur-
ance exhortation that courts and juries will deal fairly with them is of
little avail.21 They have their own ideas as to legitimate risks. They
have their own fears that public disapproval of financiers and big busi-
214. See note 205, supra.
215. Question may be raised whether the insertion with reference to omissions in Sec-
tion 12 (2) of the phrase, "in the light of the circumstances under which they [the state-
ments] were made," may not be a two-edged sword. Conceivably it would permit a
vendor merely to name a security and state its price (if the transaction were not subject
to Section 5) without requiring further representations. May it also be employed to require
of vendors disclosure of any material facts peculiarly within their knowledge? Cf. note
213, supra. If so, the requirement in Section 12 (2) goes considerably further than the
somewhat similar one in Section 11. See note 92, supra.
216. § 24.
217. There is no provision in the Act comparable to that of the Companies Act, supra
note 27, § 372, which gives protection against blackmailers and some assurance against
severe judgments in hard cases. It provides that "(1) If in any proceeding for negligence,
default, breach of duty or breach of trust against a person to whom this section applies
it appears to the court hearing the case that the person is or may be liable in respect of the
negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust, but that he has acted honestly and
reasonably, and that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including those
connected with his appointment, he ought fairly to be excused for the negligence, default,
breach of duty or breach of trust, that court may relieve him, either wholly or partly, from
his liability on such terms as the court may think fit." The section provides further for
a declaratory judgment and gives the court discretion as to allocation of costs. It applies
to directors, managers and officers of a company, and to persons employed by a company
as auditors, whether they are or are not officers of the company.
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ness in times of falling prices will be reflected in adverse verdicts. These
notions and ideas may appear idle and foolish to those on the sidelines.
But they constitute a -fact which no Securities Act can ignore. They
exist as a reality.
On the other hand clients who want only assurance that they are not
beyond all doubt violating the Act, or clients who desire assurance that
they have better than an even chance of not being held liable, or clients
who want competent counsel's advice that if they act in good faith and
reasonably under all the circumstances the chances are good that they
will incur no liability, can proceed to do most of the legitimate things
which they want to do. Many of those in this group are impecunious
and have everything to gain by taking a chance. Others have "rich
wives." Some are launching new enterprises where the set-up is so simple
as to render remote the likelihood of misstatement. And still others
in the group are substantial men who, if wise, expect compensation for
the risks assumed. To them the theoretical possibilities of liability un-
der the Act are of little concern; to them a clarified Act would be de-
sirable but unnecessary.
Which group is the larger it is difficult to say. Whether the attitudes
of the first group will change is also difficult of prediction. It is clear,
however, that the effect of the Act on legitimate business is measured, not
in terms of what courts will ultimately hold obscure provisions to mean,
but in terms of the attitudes of business. If, therefore, it is the desire of
Congress "to protect the public with the least possible interference to
honest business" in accordance with the President's mandate, the Act
should be amended promptly not so as to change its fundamental prin-
ciples but in order to make it unambiguous, clear, and consistent.
Curiously enough, however, an ambiguous statute might have great
advantages, since it would give the enforcing agency a powerful weapon
for control. Arnold has described the relation of the criminal law to
the prosecutor "not as something to be enforced because it governs so-
ciety, but as an arsenal of weapons with which to incarcerate certain
dangerous individuals who are bothering society."218  By the same token
an ambiguous Act might give the enforcing agency a full "arsenal of
weapons" with which to control financial practices deemed inimical to the
public interest. But this would be true only if the power of adminis-
tration were fairly well concentrated in one agency. This is not true of
the Act. The enforcing agencies under the Act are the Federal Trade
Commission and the courts. Civil as well as criminal penalties are en-
forceable by the courts. The Commission on the other hand is the
administrative agency. Its powers in general are of four kinds: (1) to




issue stop orders;219 (2) to obtain injunctive relief against violation of
the act; 220 (3) to interpret accounting and trade terms;2 2 1 and (4) to
make rules and regulations, including those governing registration state-
ments and prospectuses.
222
The power to issue stop orders has been discussed in an accompanying
article.223 One need not agree with all that is said there to affirm that a
most salutary effect on security buyers would flow from a wise exercise
of this power. Prevention is always better than compensation. Never-
theless this power is exercisable only if the registration statement on its
face is incomplete or inaccurate in any material respect or if it contains
an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact
required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein
not misleading.22 In contradistinction to some state laws22 1 the stop
order is not issuable on the grounds that the security is deemed to be un-
sound. Being limited as it is the most that can be expected is that it
will be employed (1) to assure that complete and unambiguous schedules
are filed and (2) to catch flagrant omissions and patent misstatements.
It is idle to expect more. In the twenty day waiting period the Commis-
sion's check cannot but be superficial. And the subsequent exercise of
the power could hardly be more pervasive. The Commission can never
be so well acquainted with the internal affairs of thousands of different
companies as to be able to appraise critically the truth of the intricate and
detailed mass of facts from which the registration statement is drawn.226
At very best the power is a check on flagrant abuses and excesses. And
with the possible exception of cases where the Commission has made
an investigation of particular statements and not issued a stop order,
counsel would be wise at the present stage of developments not to
advise parties prospectively liable under Section 11 that they have
thereby acquired additional defenses. A contrary assumption could not
be founded on any realistic capacity of the Commission to analyze and
investigate.
The power of the Commission to obtain injunctive relief is probably
of secondary importance from the viewpoint of investors. It is not a
219. § 8.
220. § 20(b). Also of importance is the availability of mandamus. § 20(c). More
significant is the power to investigate alleged violations of the Act. §§ 8(e), 19(b), 20(a),
21 and 22(b) and (c).
221. § 19(a).
222. Ibid.
223. Rodell, Regulation of Securities by the Federal Trade Commission (1933) 43
YATE L. J. 272.
224. § 8(b), (c) and (d).





means of concentrating the power of interpretation and administration,
for it preserves the duality of control between commission and court.
But in case of interpretation of accounting and trade terms the power
is more effective since it is lodged solely in the Commission. It has been
asserted that this gives extensive control, since scarcely a term is not "a
trade term in view of the fact that its meaning is rightly significant only in
relation to the 'trade' of floating securities. 221 7  It is idle to speculate on
the extreme limits to which a tolerant judiciary might permit such
power to be carried. But it seems more likely that such words will be
interpreted to mean business, financial, or street terms. Thus "distri-
bution, ;)22 8 "open or counter market,' ' 229 "distributors' or sellers' com-
mission,112 30 and the like are the kind of words fairly described as trade
terms. It is inconceivable that the measure of damages, 231 "fiduciary
relationship,1232  "reasonable investigation, ' 233  "supervision of any
court ' 2 3  and the like fall within "trade terms." In fact a review of the
Act, section by section,2  will show far more terms which the Commission
does not have power to interpret than otherwise. This power should
not, however, be confused with the general power of the Commission to
interpret the Act, arising incidentally out of its power to administer it.
As has been admitted this power has not the force of law, but at very
best rests on the somewhat tenuous ground of estoppel.23 6
More important, however, than any of the foregoing powers is the
power to make rules and regulations governing registration statements
and prospectuses for various classes of securities and issuers. *While the
power does not enable the Commission freely to exempt securities from
registration,237 it does give it some discretion in adjusting the registration
and prospectus to the needs and requirements of various situations. To
date the Commission has taken significant action in several directions.
For example, in the case of protective committees it has ruled that cer-
tain information respecting the company being reorganized, if not known
by the committee, may be given from the most reliable source available.
As has been seen, however, committees have no defense of good faith,
reasonable care, or even reasonable investigation. They are absolute
227. See Landis, supra note 7, at 10.
228. See particularly §§ 2 (11) and 4 (1).
229. § 4 (2).
230. § 2 (11). Query, whether "public offer" is a trade term.
231. § 11(e) (2).
232. § 11(c).
233. § 11(b) (3) (A).
234. § 4 (3).
235. 'Accounting terms probably present no great problem. And Schedules A and B of
the Act probably constitute the greatest source of trade terms for interpretation by the
Commission.
236. Landis, supra note 7, at 10.
237. Tae power to exempt from registration is strictly limited. § 3(b).
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guarantors of the registration statement. Nevertheless it is absurd to
think that having given secondhand information pursuant to the regu-
lation of the Commission they would be held liable for inaccuracies
in it, except under two circumstances. The first is that the information
given was not a true copy or statement of the data relied upon. The
other is that the information obtained was not the most reliable which
was available. The Commission obviously would have the power to
rule that no facts respecting the company need be given. Having that
power it certainly has the lesser power to rule that certain information
need be given only in an unverified condition. In other words, by its
regulations concerning the registration and the prospectus it can con-
dition the meaning of the word "untrue" in Section 11. By the same
token it can, if it so desires, relax or tighten up on the registration re-
quirements for any other class of issuer or for any other type of security.
But at this point its powers cease. It has no power to regulate the types
of information which must be substantiated by directors, officers, under-
writers and experts except as its regulations of issuers and various types
of securities incidentally affect those persons. In large measure Con-
gress has supplied an iron-clad standard of conduct which may not be
relaxed or tightened up by the Commission. It must act within the
rather narrow ambit prescribed for it.
Incidental to its powers to administer, is its power to interpret. And
if in particular instances it rules that a transaction or person does not
come within the Act it seems fairly safe to predict that courts will later
not impose civil or criminal penalties on those who relied upon the rul-
ing.238  But that relates to rulings only on particular and immediate sit-
uations. By accretion of judicial decision the jurisdiction of the Com-
mission will be expanded or restricted and the course of conduct for the
future established. This means that the residuum (constituting the bulk)
of problems under the Act falls upon the courts for interpretation. Those
courts are not only the federal but also the state and territorial courts.2 39
It is idle to predict the extent of the agreement between the Commission
and these many different courts. The only thing certain is that there can
be no semblance of uniformity for many years. That is the major mis-
fortune of the present Act. It has a profound unsettling effect on busi-
ness activities. And from the point of view of administration it is equal-
ly unfortunate. It is not uncertainty in definition but the wide dispersion
of authority with its attendant uncertainty which creates confusion in
administrative control.
Much has been written respecting needed amendments to the Act.
If the Act is not remodelled, the only temporary expedient is to make
it clear, consistent and certain. The earlier parts of this essay indicate




most of the points of friction and obscurity. As so amended the Act
would leave much to be desired. But it would at least present a definite
code of conduct under which some experience could be gained. Another
definite step which should be taken whether or not the Act is clarified
is the adoption of the provisions in Section 372 of the Companies Act.
240
This would not interfere at all with the prophylactic purposes of the
Act. In substance it probably would add but little. Nevertheless it
would give some assurance to honest and reliable business which is now
lacking. It would also give some protection against blackmailing which
though overestimated by some is a positive factor so far as business
attitudes go.
241
Along with these makeshifts there might also go an extension of the
powers of the Commission so as to enable it further to adapt the Act to
the requirements of particular situations. In conjunction therewith or
in lieu thereof the powers of the Commission might be extended to ad-
judicate at least some of the civil disputes arising under the Act. Or
enforcement of those rights might be concentrated in one other tribunal.
The necessity for one tribunal is especially acute in cases of contribution,
for, as has been seen, under the present system such actions would be
almost endless in number, and would entail many different suits on the
same or similar issues in many separate courts.
But if the problem were presented de novo it would be urged that the
Act be recast to accomplish the same results in much simpler and more
direct fashion and in a way which would permit of a more flexible, and
accordingly a more effective, administration. The classes of persons to
whom the Act applied would be stated in simple and clear terms. The
nature of liability would be determined in light of the realities of the
circumstances under which it was imposed. Furthermore, the scope of
liability would be set within more definite limits so as to make the risks
more predictable and hence more legitimate. And penalties placed on
various persons would be adjusted in light of their capacity reasonably to
bear them as well as with a view to securing the greatest protection
to investors-two things by no means incompatible. Specifically this
would mean a reduction in the in terrorem aspects of the Act. Those
are important from a preventive angle. But they soon reach a point
where their effectiveness ceases. If their purpose is to prohibit certain
transactions, the end could be reached more directly and with less
doubt that the ancillary effects might exceed in importance the ones
desired. Furthermore, the in terrorem means are feeble instruments of
continuous administration. It is difficult to make them survive political
attack. Traditionally they have been the object of extensive judicial
emasculation. And they breed ways for circumvention-whether it be
240. See note 217, supra.
241. Cf. Frankfurter, supra note 4, at 111.
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the advent of impecunious persons or of men who transfer their assets
to their wives or the conjuration of more subtle devices. The most a
statute should be expected to do in an in terrorem way is to make it
provident for the various parties to act reasonably and in good faith.
The standards of good faith and reasonable conduct should supply an
adequate deterrent.
Furthermore, regulation in this field is and will remain relatively un-
important from a compensatory angle. Civil and criminal suits can never
compensate for losses suffered in improvident investments. Reparation
can never serve the same high purpose as prevention. In this connection
it should be remembered that man's habit of sleeping on his legal rights
is notorious. That is due not always to ignorance but to his judgment of
the futility of spending a thousand dollars to get a thousand dollars. The
truth of this generalization is apparent from the extremely small number
of claims actually prosecuted in some of our recent and more notorious
scandals.
This leads to the conclusion that the only effective agency in continuous
administration is the power to control access to the market. Hence if the
Act were recast along the lines suggested, a greater administrative con-
trol would be one of its most salient features. With a definite but broad
legislative text as a basis, it would have within its limits a more pervasive
and flexible power to deal with the wide variety of matters that would
confront it. 4 Its discretion to classify, interpret, impose conditions,
or exempt would be exercised in light of the public interest and the pro-
tection of investors. Such an agency as finally and fully developed would
be comparable to few which we know today. An agency for control in
the security field would have a maze of different and diverse enterprises
with which to deal. There are no simple and clear categories into which
the problems fall. They are as complicated as the entire social and in-
dustrial system. They are essentially kaleidoscopic. So it is no easy
task to set up an administrative agency which would adequately and ef-
fectively exercise control in this field. But if the Securities Act is a mere
harbinger of additional regulation over finance the problem of adminis-
trative control will become more and more acute as years pass. It is
therefore essential that the main structural features of that agency be set
with a view not only to its immediate needs but also its later require-
ments.
The foregoing is, however, subject to the one important practical quali-
fication that no legislative or administrative control in this field can be
evolved overnight with any expectation of measurable success. Such
242. As Commissioner Landis has stated in another connection, "The control of financing
inherently bristles with complex situations adaptable far better to particularized adminis-
trative action than to the generalities that must of necessity characterize the legislative pro-
cess." Landis, supra note 7, at 10.
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control cannot spring full grown like Minerva. Rather the problem is
one of slow and gradual evolution with each step being taken in light of
tested expedients.243 The result is that the most that can be immediately
expected is the prevention of excesses and fraudulent practices. But the
ultimate range of a more thoroughgoing control would extend, so far as
practicable, from "unsound" securities to high pressure salesmanship.
That would eventually mean administrative control over access to the
market, whatever temporary expedients are adopted.
243. The English experience in connection with the Companies Act is very much in point.
